


OPERATIONAL AUDIT OF THE CLARKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE FY14 – FY18



**Stephanie Maddox, Internal Auditor
Office of Operational Analysis 301
College Avenue, Suite 202
Athens, GA 30601**

The Office of Operational Analysis (formerly the Auditor's Office) was created by the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County Charter. The Internal Auditor reports directly to the Mayor and Commission.

The Office of Operational Analysis is responsible for examining and evaluating the "fiscal affairs and operations of every department, office, and agency of the Unified Government for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations for the benefit of ACC decision makers as well as members of the Athens-Clarke community.

The Office of Operational Analysis provides independent oversight of county government through independent audits and other reports. Examples of the type of work we perform are strategic planning, fiscal analysis, feasibility studies, program evaluations, and staffing reviews.

The Audit Committee assists the Office of Operational Analysis with the development of the Annual Audit Work Plan. The committee is made up of five commissioners and is chaired by Commissioner Melissa Link.

Audit Committee

Melissa Link, Chair
Patrick Davenport
Allison Wright
Ovita Thornton
Russell Edwards

Audit Management

Stephanie R. Maddox, Internal Auditor

Audit Staff

Jill M. Arquette, Management Analyst
Deborah Allen, Administrative Assistant
Bolade Abodunrin, Student Intern

You can obtain copies of this report by contacting us at:



Office of Operational Analysis
City Hall
301 College Avenue; Suite 202
Athens, GA 30601
(706) 613-3012

Or download and view an electronic copy by visiting our website at www.accgov.com/operationalanalysis
Report Number: FY18.1.26



August 6, 2019

INTERNAL AUDITOR'S REPORT

The Office of Operational Analysis has completed an operational audit of the Clarke County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) for the period July 2013 to June 2018 (FY14 - FY18). The primary objectives of the audit were to review agency practices related to policies and procedures, assess staffing levels compared to workload responsibilities, and examine the organizational structure and operations of the SO. This audit report includes 34 findings and recommendations that, if implemented, could improve employee satisfaction, increase retention, and eventually replace mandatory overtime with optional overtime. **Note:** All references to the positions within this report refer to the individuals in those roles from January 1, 2018, through December 1, 2018.

We extend appreciation to the CCSO personnel who assisted and cooperated with this audit. We look forward to finalizing our work with the CCSO this month with the conclusion of the *Inmate Medical Services* review.

Special thanks to Chief Jimps Cole designated as the primary contact for the audit and whose assistance was instrumental throughout the entire process.

Office of Operational Analysis

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Steph Maddox', is written over the printed name.

Stephanie R. Maddox, Internal Auditor

REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

The Office of Operational Analysis has completed an operational audit of the Clarke County Sheriff's Office (CCSO). In the fall of 2017, prior to the commencement of the audit, the Internal Auditor met twice with Sheriff Ira Edwards and Chief Deputy Jimps Cole to discuss organizational and operational challenges within the Sheriff's Office (SO). A summary report detailing these challenges was presented to the Audit Committee at the next scheduled meeting. The Audit Committee agreed to recommend an operational audit of the SO to the full Commission.

In January 2018, the Mayor and Commission approved an audit of the CCSO as part of the Office of Operational Analysis' (OOA) Annual Work Plan. Immediately after approval, OOA notified the SO and began pre-audit planning. Despite welcoming the audit and expressing commitment towards the process and increased transparency, Sheriff Edwards informed us that he would not be serving as the primary audit contact for the SO. Instead, he designated Chief Deputy Jimps Cole to serve as our primary contact for the audit.

In March 2018, audit field work officially began with an anonymous employee engagement survey developed by the audit team (See Appendix A). The survey participation rate was high; 81% or 139 out of 171 employees completed the survey. The survey response rate yielded a 95% confidence level and a 4% margin of error. Essentially, the confidence level and margin of error are indicators expressing how strongly one can rely on survey results. For example, in the SO survey, 77% of respondents reported that the major concern in the SO was poor morale. The 95% confidence interval supports the certainty that between 73% (77-4%) and 81% (77+4%) of SO employees believed poor morale was the biggest issue affecting the culture in the CCSO.

Overall, survey results suggested that the majority of employees were unhappy working in the SO. Statistically significant noteworthy results from the survey were:

- ◆ Low morale
- ◆ Inadequate staff training
- ◆ Insufficient available staffing per facility requirements
- ◆ Safety concerns among staff
- ◆ Excessive reliance on overtime to staff ongoing regular operational functions
- ◆ Lack of trust in leadership
- ◆ Sick Leave Abuse Policy
- ◆ Intimidation and retaliation
- ◆ Perceived (and documented) favoritism
- ◆ Lack of leadership support
- ◆ Inconsistencies in disciplinary actions

Directly after the survey closed, the audit team began audit interviews. In all, more than 80 people were interviewed between March 2018 and July 2018. In addition to audit interviews, the audit staff conducted field observations and individual ride-alongs with SO deputies. Staff observations were of courthouse security, courtroom security, warrant processes, civil processes, and jail operations.

Our review and analysis of survey responses, audit interviews, and field observations revealed a significant concern, which fell into four areas, intrinsically related to each other. The four areas are: staffing shortage, poor morale, safety concerns, and inadequate training. In addition to the four areas of concern or macro concerns, were micro concerns that were also intrinsically related (See mind map, located right before the executive summary). Attempts to resolve any one area relied on addressing all four areas. Also, any

improvements in one area would improve the other areas. Conversely, failure to address issues in one area would negatively influence efforts in other areas.

FOUR SIGNIFICANT CONCERNS:

1. **Staffing shortage** – The Jail Division and Field Division, were both understaffed. Specifically, in the Jail Division, the staffing level was not sufficient to sustain post-shift assignments without the implementation of mandatory overtime across the board for all positions in the CCSO below the rank of Sergeant. The bulk of the overtime hours were inherently assigned to jail staff. This is possibly due to proximity and familiarity with jail operations even though all employees began their career at the SO assigned to the Jail Division. Jail employees were mandated to work three additional 12-hour shifts per month. Deputies assigned to the Field Division were mandated to work one additional 12-hour shift per month. Overtime also had a negative effect on the operations of the Field Division. For example, despite the staffing shortage in the Field Division, field deputies were regularly reassigned from their routine positions of serving warrants or providing court house security to fill in staffing gaps at the jail. The reassignment of field road deputies resulted in an increase in the number of outstanding warrants needing to be served and the deputies assigned to court room security were spread thin.
2. **Morale and Leadership** – Several elements contributed to poor employee morale at the SO. Mandatory overtime had a significant impact on employee morale. The primary reason overtime was mandated was due to low recruitment and retention numbers; which could not keep pace with staffing, thus, sustaining the shortage. Having the biggest effect on morale according to staff interviews and survey responses, was the new Leave Usage policy, established during the audit examination period. Originally established, to discourage employees from calling in sick when required to overtime, the new policy did not deliver the results for which it was established. Employees renamed the policy. Instead of referring to the policy by its correct name, the Leave Usage policy, employees in every position and rank from administrative to sworn including captains nicknamed the policy the “sick-leave abuse policy.” Employees stated they felt punished when they were sick because policy language stated that they must see a doctor and present an official note upon their return to work. Which caused many not to want to go through the trouble and decided to go to work sick; in some cases with contagious symptoms.
3. **Safety and Security** –Sixty-five percent of survey respondents stated that jail security needs to be improved. Employees stated components of jail operations are unsafe and expose the entire jail to possible security threats. Deputies assigned to the Jail Division report feeling vulnerable when calling for backup. Due to staffing shortages; they did not know if anyone would respond if an emergency arose. Also, officers stated they were reluctant to discipline inmates when they violated policies. According to survey responses and in-person interviews, the number of disciplinary days an inmate is supposed to receive for an infraction does not always follow the established parameters outlined in the inmate policy and procedures manual. Deputies state disruptive inmates are removed from the unit but are returned early, which emboldened inmates to continue negative behavior. The majority interviewed reported that the general consensus amongst staff is that the inmates ran the jail.
4. **Training** – The training offered to new hires declined significantly since the opening of the new jail according to veteran deputies. Prior to the opening of the new jail, veteran deputies reported receiving months of training and the opportunity to rotate and work in every area of the jail. Over the years, the SO stopped providing comprehensive training on jail operations to new hires. Instead, new hires were offered 3-5 days of training before they were assigned to a post to work alone. A

review of exit interviews, survey responses, and in-person interviews suggested the abbreviated new-hire training was not sufficient to address build up the confidence of officers. Employees admitted that intimidation was a leading cause of low employee retention. Additionally, officers assigned to a housing unit in the Jail Division described their job as stressful and isolating. Jail officers reported when working a 12-hour shift, they rarely received support from a supervisor as it relates to checking in on deputies during the 12 hours, providing relief for officers to take bathroom breaks, or covering posts for deputies so that they could eat their lunch outside of the housing unit.

After a draft report was completed, a copy was provided to the SO in February 2019 for review and comment. After a reviewing and discussing CCSO comments to audit recommendations, additional questions came up that required follow-up with the SO. We received a final response to recommendations from the SO in May and folded them into this report starting on page 47.

This final report includes 34 recommendations that, if implemented, could improve employee satisfaction, increase retention, and eventually replace mandatory overtime with optional overtime.

The audit team is pleased the SO has agreed to expand recruitment efforts and re-establish the formal training program for new hires. We are also pleased the SO has agreed to implement the majority of the 34 recommendations related to the four major areas of concern: recruitment and retention, training, safety and security, and leadership and morale. In summary, the SO's agrees with 19 of the 34 recommendations, disagrees with eight, agrees in part with six, and is undecided about one. The audit team found several responses to be ambiguous and require further clarification. We elaborate our questions and concerns below and have communicated them to the Sheriff's Office.

Sheriff's Office Agrees: #'s 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32

Sheriff's Office Disagrees: #'s 4, 6, 10, 16, 20, 24, 27, 28

Sheriff's Office Agrees in Part: #'s 18, 25, 26, 33, 34

Undecided: # 3

Needs Clarification: #'s 5, 7, 12,

- ◆ Finding #5, *scheduling of overtime is poorly implemented*, the SO responds by stating, "Substituting overtime is no longer allowed." In response to a follow-up question, the SO stated, "We felt that we were losing overtime hours by allowing certain members to substitute their overtime obligation to someone else." The audit team found this policy change to be unclear; how does one employee working a 12-hour shift for another employee equate to a loss in overtime hours. The response from the SO suggests that employees willing to work overtime above the mandatory requirement are being punished.
- ◆ Finding #7, the SO states they agree with the recommendation to re-establish the JTO program and offer new hires more comprehensive training. However, the initial response from the SO stated it would take "6-12 months to digitize it and train the trainers." In a follow-up request to explain what 6-12 months to digitize entails, the SO did not directly answer the question. Instead, the response given was that "the JTO program existed only in paper form. It has not been transformed into an electronic format." It is unclear why the training program will take 6-12 months to initiate if it has been digitized.
- ◆ Finding #12, the SO states they agree with supporting employees who are interested in becoming a supervisor. The SO's response states, "Rotating among assignments in the jail is another way to prepare for supervisory training." However, the audit team questions the likelihood of employees receiving this type of support as long as the SO is understaffed. For example, the SO's response to recommendation #10, "position assignments will always be supervisory controlled

We want to thank the SO for their cooperation and assistance with our audit. The Audit Team would also like to especially thank Chief Deputy Jimps Cole, who was designated as our point of contact throughout the audit.

The Office of Operational Analysis would like to express sincere appreciation to all current employees, former employees, and retirees of the Clarke County Sheriff's Office who were interviewed and offered frank, constructive input that contributed to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephanie R. Maddox, Internal Auditor

Copy: Kelly Girtz, Mayor
Blaine Williams, Manager
Deborah Lonon, Assistant Manager

Josh Edwards, Assistant Manager
Judd Drake, Attorney
Jean Spratlin, Clerk of Commission

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
A. Purpose	1
B. Scope and Objective	2
C. Audit Methodology	2
D. Background	3
II. FINAL REPORT	6
A. Staffing	6
Recruitment and Retention	10
Overtime	13
B. Training	16
New Hire Training	16
Job-Related Training	21
Training Discrepancies between Divisions	21
C. Safety & Security	23
Safety	23
Security	26
D. Morale & Leadership	30
Morale	30
Leadership	35
E. Warrant Services	40
F. Inmate Medical Care	41
G. Comparison of Prior Audits of the Sheriff's Office	41
H. Conclusion	44
III. RESPONSE FROM THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE	47
List of Exhibits	
Exhibit 1: Jail Fixed-Post Staffing	8
Exhibit 2: Court Security Fixed-Post Deputy Staffing	9
Exhibit 3: Warrant Services Fixed-Post Deputy Staffing	9
Exhibit 4: Average Turnover Rate	10
Exhibit 5: Recruitment of Detention Officer Positions	11
Exhibit 6: Recruitment of Deputy Sheriff Positions	11
Exhibit 7: Reasons for Voluntary Resignation	13

Exhibit 8:	Budgeted vs. Actual Overtime (\$)	14
Exhibit 9:	Additional Training and Development	18
Exhibit 10:	Favoritism	20
Exhibit 11:	Cyclical Process of Additional Training	20
Exhibit 12:	Average Inmate Population	27
Exhibit 13:	Staffing of Jail Shifts	28
Exhibit 14:	Inability to Speak Honestly with Supervisors	31
Exhibit 15:	Concerns Regarding Retaliation	32
Exhibit 16:	Major Concerns with Sheriff's Office	32
Exhibit 17:	Sick Leave Usage FY14-FY18	34

Common Acronyms and Definitions

FiFa	Fieri Facias (writ of execution)
FTO	Field Training Officer
G.C.I.C	Georgia Crime Information Center
GPSTC	Georgia Public Safety Training Center
GSA	Georgia Sheriff's Association
JTO	Jail Training Officer
N.C.I.C.	National Crime Information Center
OOA	Office of Operational Analysis
P.O.S.T.	Peace Officer Standards and Training
PowerDMS	Policy Management Software
SO / CCSO	Clarke County Sheriff's Office

Effect of Low Staffing Levels in the Clarke County Jail



I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of Operational Analysis (OOA) conducted an operational audit of the Clarke County Sheriff's Office (CCSO). OOA commenced work on this audit in March 2018 and concluded in February 2019. [Note: All references to positions within the report refer to the individuals in those positions from January 1, 2018 through December 1, 2018.](#)

To say it is challenging to summarize the details of a complex state of affairs at the CCSO in just a few paragraphs is an understatement. There are too many themes to summarize here concisely. This report is divided into several chapters. These chapters include:

1. Executive Summary and Background
2. Final Report
3. Agency Response

This operational audit determines the extent and effect of a severe staffing shortage at the Clarke County Jail. This audit also identifies the primary causes of the staffing shortage – no one factor explains the Sheriff's Office (SO) low staffing level. Mandatory overtime, low morale, poor leadership, inadequate training, etc. have all played a role, amongst others. Direct supervisors (lieutenants and sergeants) and members of the command staff have a significant impact on employee turnover. In the employee survey and interviews, staff expressed dissatisfaction with their direct supervisor for their lack of support. Consistent turnover of staff within the jail has hindered the SO's ability to adequately and reliably cover mandatory security posts. This report includes a discussion regarding several major themes affecting staffing levels within the SO. They include:

- ◆ Low staffing levels at the jail
- ◆ Lack of quality recruits
- ◆ Insufficient training for new employees
- ◆ Safety concerns
- ◆ Disregard of established security procedures
- ◆ Low morale
- ◆ Poor leadership
- ◆ Increase in outstanding warrants
- ◆ Quality of inmate medical care

A. Purpose

In January 2018, the Mayor and Commission voted to approve an audit of the CCSO. The purpose of this audit was to review the operations of the SO with an emphasis on staffing and employee job satisfaction. The audit was conducted according to Article IV, Section 4-104 and Article VII, Section 7-410 of the Charter of the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, Georgia and the ordinance and the policies guiding the conduct of reviews.

B. Scope and Objectives

The primary scope of this report was to undertake a comprehensive review of the operational practices, policies and procedures, and staffing levels at the CCSO for the period of July 2013 through June 2018 (FY14-FY18). The following is a summary of the audit objectives:

- ◆ Determine if staffing levels at the SO are sufficient to meet the mandatory workload

requirements

- ◆ Assess staff turnover and its effects on workload distribution at the jail
- ◆ Evaluate the adequacy of training offered to new employees
- ◆ Identify factors contributing to low morale among staff
- ◆ Examine operational practices for managing and administering overtime
- ◆ Identify how staffing shortages and mandatory overtime affects employee morale
- ◆ Assess the quality of inmate medical services
- ◆ Provide an update regarding the implementation of previous audit recommendations

To answer these questions, the audit team analyzed information from the following sources: Policies and Procedures, Standard Operating Procedures, and training material provided by the SO; and staffing and workload requirements, separation reports, previous audits of the CCSO from 1998 and 2005, FY14-FY18 Annual Operating and Capital Budget books, reports from other jurisdictions, employee interviews, the employee survey, and various other data provided upon request as the audit was underway.

C. Audit Methodology

To accomplish the scope of work in this audit, the audit team followed a three-phase auditing process. The three phases of the audit of the SO are:

1. Phase I – Pre-Audit Planning and Research
2. Phase II – Operational Review and Assessment
3. Phase III – Development of Final Report

Phase I – Pre-Audit Planning and Research

- ◆ The Internal Auditor met with the Sheriff before the start of the audit. The purpose of the meeting was to develop an initial understanding of the issues, which led to this audit.
- ◆ The audit team developed an anonymous employee engagement survey to gather data about knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of employees working at the CCSO.
- ◆ The audit team developed a list of pertinent interview questions to support an organized, thoughtful interview process.

Phase II – Operational Review and Assessment

The audit team assessed operational efficiency and effectiveness by reviewing agency practices related to policies and procedures, assessing staffing levels compared to workload responsibilities, and by examining the organizational structure and operations of the SO.

- ◆ Interviewed employees and conducted field observations in every division of the CCSO (Administration, Field, and Jail) to gain a better understanding of the agency. Conducted approximately 80 staff interviews representing each function, division, and rank for sworn positions and civilian positions. Interviewed employees, retirees, and former employees of the SO and conducted field observations in every division.
- ◆ Reviewed the deployment of personnel by division, unit, and shift, with a focus on staffing.
- ◆ Reviewed documents provided by the SO, Finance Department, and Human Resources for the audit period (FY14-FY18). Documents included but were not limited to: exit interviews of former employees, overtime reports, employee leave usage with an emphasis on employee sick leave, employee code of conduct, vendor contracts, and various inmate policies.

Phase III – Final Report Development

The audit team prepared a report to summarize recommendations identified to improve the current state of agency operations.

- ◆ Prepare a preliminary report, including background, findings, and recommendations for the SO to review and provide responses within 30 days.
- ◆ Finalize audit report after receiving responses from the SO. The final report will include background, findings, recommendations, agency response, and implementation schedule, which will summarize the recommendations accepted by the agency.

D. Background

The CCSO, similar to other public safety agencies, is experiencing a significant staffing shortage. The agency averaged a 12% vacancy rate over the audit's five-year evaluation (FY14-FY18). Several factors were identified as contributing to the staffing shortage at the CCSO:

- ① Recruiting efforts have not kept pace with employee separations.
- ② Qualified applicants are difficult to find.
- ③ "Reality shock" kicks in after being hired - "this is not what I thought it would be."
- ④ High vacancies create a need for mandatory overtime.
- ⑤ Mandatory overtime results in employee burnout, reduced work performance, reduced job satisfaction, and potential health problems.

To initiate the audit, the OOA invited SO employees to participate in an anonymous employee survey. Upon the conclusion of the survey, the audit team received and analyzed the responses. The audit team identified four significant topics affecting the SO:

- ① Staffing – The SO is heavily dependent on the use of overtime to meet understaffing levels. All SO staff required to work overtime at the jail to support its operations.
- ② Morale – Mandatory overtime, the sick-leave abuse policy, perceptions of inadequate leadership, lack of job-growth opportunities, and favoritism harm staff morale.
- ③ Safety – Deputies within the jail feel vulnerable when calling for backup due to staffing shortages and its consequent emboldening of inmates.
- ④ Training – All new employees at the SO start their careers at the jail. At maximum capacity, inmate housing units hold 62 inmates under the supervision of a single officer. Three to five days of training and orientation is not a sufficient time to develop confidence or competence new officers need to perform these assignments alone. This has been cited in exit interviews as a reason for new deputies separating their employment.

Organizationally, the SO is divided into three divisions: Administration, Field Services, and the Jail. The FY18 actual budget was \$16.9 million. Of this amount, Administration accounted for \$1.1 million (7%), Field Services accounted for \$3.9 million (23%), and the Jail accounted for \$11.9 million (70%).

Administration Division

According to the Clarke County Sheriff's Office webpage, Administration is responsible for the coordination of all public relations and personnel management functions within the SO, including public information, community relations, hiring, training, compensation, internal investigations, professional standards (CALEA National Accreditation, State Certification), staffing, purchasing, and budgeting. The Administration Division is authorized 10 sworn positions, including the Sheriff and Chief Deputy, and three non-sworn positions. Appendix B depicts the current organization of the Administration Division divided into the following three

functional units:

1. *Personnel* is responsible for matters involving member selection, hiring, payroll, investigation, discipline, complaints, and termination of employment. The Internal Investigations group is included in this Unit and is responsible for investigating all allegations of illegal or unprofessional staff conduct.
2. *Public Relations* is responsible for coordinating media and public information releases, community service activities, and community education programs such as D.A.R.E., PRIDE, and Law Enforcement Explorers.
3. *Professional Standards and Training* is responsible for orientation of new members, in-service training for all existing members, and dissemination of office policies and procedures. Accreditation and Certification is responsible for the management of the CALEA accreditation process.

Field Division

The Field Division, which is located in the Clarke County Courthouse, is comprised of 50 employees, (43 sworn and seven non-sworn personnel) and divided into two sections: Field Services and Court Services. The primary responsibility of Field Services is to serve criminal warrants, process civil and subpoena papers, execute evictions, serve Fi-fa's, transport prisoners to court, and to transport mental health clients to appointments at regional facilities throughout the state. The primary responsibility of Court Services is to provide security for the courthouse and courtrooms. Appendix C depicts the current organization of the Field Division.

Field Services

According to the CCSO webpage, Field Services is responsible for processing and serving warrants, processing and serving civil papers (protective orders, civil summons, subpoenas, evictions, FiFas, and restraining orders), picking up inmates detained in other jurisdictions, and transporting inmates to and from the courthouse.

The audit revealed that specific duties significantly interfered with primary SO job functions: in-state and out-of-state extradition, transporting juvenile offenders and mental health clients to and from Clarke County to various state facilities, and re-assigning Field Services Deputies to the jail to cover staffing shortages.

Court Services

According to the CCSO webpage, Court Services is responsible for the safety and security of the courthouse, parking deck, and all individuals within those areas. They provide security within the courtrooms and conduct weapon screenings at the courthouse entrances. This section is also responsible for in-state and out-of-state extradition of inmates, transporting inmates safely to and from court, maintaining GCIC/NCIC operations, and maintaining the sexual offender files in Clarke County.

Jail Division

There are 131 full-time positions (102 sworn and 29 non-sworn) authorized for the Jail Division, and they are divided into three functional units: Operations, Support, and Programs. The Jail Division is responsible for the security, health, and welfare of all inmates in the jail. The Jail Division provides medical services to inmates by jail medical staff and transports inmates to medical appointments or other medical facilities. Appendix D depicts the current organization of the Jail Division.

Operations Unit

The Operations Unit oversees the housing, intake, and release areas of the jail. Deputies work either 12.25 or eight-hour shifts. The Operations Unit is the largest unit within the jail, with 86% of the jails authorized sworn staff assigned to this unit. The Operations Unit is responsible for lawful admission and release of inmates, securely detaining the inmates while in their custody, and

supervising the provision of necessary services to the same.

Support Unit

The Support Unit contains four sub-sections: Inmate Services, Food Service, Classification, and Maintenance.

- ◆ Inmate Services oversees inmate visitation, coordination with the courts regarding the inmate's length of stay, commissary services, and other areas such as laundry and library.
- ◆ Food Services assembles and distributes all meals (prepared by the Corrections Department) to inmates detained in the jail.
- ◆ Classification is responsible for the assignment of all inmates that are to be detained within the jail. Classification staff interviews and observes each detainee to determine proper placement based on the following factors: age, gender identity, sexual orientation, health, mobility, etc. Male high-security inmates are set apart, observed for 72 hours, and then classified by demeanor. Female high-security inmates are immediately placed into the general population with no screening process, creating a safety risk to female inmates and staff.
- ◆ Maintenance personnel provides routine and preventative maintenance at the jail. Maintenance Technicians at the jail are not SO employees. They are employees from the Facilities Management Division of the Central Services Department.

Programs Unit

The Programs Unit provides opportunities for educational, religious, and rehabilitation goods and services to inmates. This unit also coordinates with outside agencies to provide post-release programs and services for inmates.

FINAL REPORT

A. Staffing

Numerous public safety agencies around the country are losing manpower with decreasing numbers of officers and recruits. Law enforcement is becoming less of a desirable career choice due to diminishing pay, high risk, and negative public perception. Agencies are struggling to find not only interested candidates but also candidates who are interested and qualified to join the force. However, fewer people are seeking work within the law enforcement field, and for those that do apply and complete all stages required for employment, the hiring process can take several months to complete.

The most critical area the audit team identified at the SO occurring during the audit period (FY14-FY18) is insufficient staffing levels in two of its three divisions: Field Services, and Jail. Employees are separating from the SO for various reasons that include excessive hours, type of work, safety concerns, and a lack of training opportunities.

To compensate for staffing shortages at the CCSO, particularly at the jail, the SO has implemented mandatory overtime. For years, the SO has been forced to prioritize work functions and assign available deputies based on a number of mandatory posts that are vacant per shift. During the audit process, the audit team learned that all officers were required to work three days of mandatory overtime per month. Approximately five months later, it came to the audit team's attention that sergeants are now required to work overtime. The increasing turnover, low recruitment, mandatory overtime, and natural scheduling problems (FMLA, military, short-term disability leave, etc.) have created a staffing and morale crisis.

Division	Mandatory Overtime Requirement
Administration	One Shift/Month
Field	One Shift/Month
Jail	Three Shifts/Month

The Clarke County Sheriff's Office is authorized 194 full-time positions (155 sworn and 39 non-sworn) and one part-time employee. At the time of the audit, the SO had 171 full-time employees, one part-time employee, and four retirees (hired in a part-time capacity to assist with firearms training and background checks).

The current staffing level is not sufficient to sustain post-shift assignments without the implementation of mandatory overtime to fill in the staffing gaps. The insufficient staffing levels in the jail affects other divisions who have to provide coverage to make up for the shortfalls in jail staff. For example, the Field Services Section gets behind on serving warrants and civil papers.

Staffing is impacted by a combination of variables, for instance: employees on military leave, FMLA, or various other forms of leave as it reduces the number of available employees to cover security fixed-posts that require 24/7 monitoring 365 days a year. A *Post* is a term used by the SO to define a work assignment and applies to both sworn and non-sworn (civilian) positions. To assure coverage of the security posts, the SO has implemented a mandatory overtime policy, which has led to tired, overworked, and disgruntled employees. Responses to the employee engagement survey and interviews with SO personnel indicated that staffing shortages have led to unsafe working conditions in the jail.

The audit team conducted staffing analysis for both the Field and Jail Divisions to determine if current

staffing allocations, established by the SO, were sufficient. Staff work one of the three work schedules illustrated depending on their job assignment. Work schedules do not include overtime.

There are three different work schedules at the SO:

12.25-hour/shift	2,230 hours/year
8.5-hour/shift	2,210 hours/year
8-hour/shift	2,080 hours/year

The staffing shortage exists in both the Field and the Jail Division. Both divisions include mandatory posts that are required to be covered 24-hours per day. Whereas the Field Division processes warrants and civil actions as well as maintaining courthouse and courtroom security, the main

objective of the employees of the jail is to provide safety and security of the inmates and staff.

Athens-Clarke County Jail



The Jail is authorized 131 full-time positions, comprised of 102 sworn and 29 civilian personnel.

POSITION TITLE	No. of Positions
Administrative Secretary	1
Captain	2
Control Room Operator	8
Deputy Sheriff	48
*Detention Officer	8
Food Service Worker	2
Intake Clerk	4
Jail Commander	1
Lieutenant	5
Programs Coordinator	1
Sergeant	11
Sheriff's Records Technician	5
Sr. Deputy Sheriff	35
TOTAL	131
<i>Total Sworn Positions</i>	<i>102</i>
<i>Total Civilian Positions</i>	<i>29</i>

The following positions are currently assigned to posts that require 24-hour coverage: Control Room Operators (8 hour shifts)

- ◆ Deputies/Sr. Deputies (12 hour shifts)
- ◆ Classification
- ◆ Intake
- ◆ Release
- ◆ Front Lobby
- ◆ Medical
- ◆ Transport/Victims
- ◆ Inmate Housing Units

During the audit period, the following number of employees were available to cover 24/7 fixed-posts:

- 8 - Control Room Operators / Civilian (8-hour shifts)
- 4 - Intake Clerks / Civilian (12-hour shifts)
- 2 - Detention Officers / Civilian (12-hour shifts)
- 68 - Deputies/Sr. Deputies / Sworn (12-hour shifts)
- 12 - Supervisors (Sgt. or Lt.) (Total of 3 per shift x 4 12 hour shifts)
- 94 Total employees available to fill a 24-hour post**

There is no definitive number for recommended staffing levels in a jail. Staffing requirements in jail are based on several variables, such as jail design and size, staff shift schedules, and operational goals. Several critical factors affect the number of personnel required to staff operations of jail security. Jail security are staff specifically dedicated to the management and safety of inmates while ensuring a secure working environment for all personnel. In the Clarke County Sheriff's Office, these include both sheriff deputies and detention officers, and their supervisors.

Staffing calculations reflect 24 additional positions, 13 in the Jail Division and 11 in the Field Division, are required to bring both divisions to full staffing levels.

The fixed-posts reflect the intention of having a minimum staffing level of 21 personnel per shift. However, minimum staffing levels are not consistently applied. For example, when shifts are short-staffed in the housing unit, the Victor, who serves as a backup throughout the jail is reassigned to cover a vacant shift assignment. Exhibit 1 reflects staffing analysis conducted by the audit team to determine the fixed-post staffing requirement for the jail. A fixed-post position is an assignment that is typically deployed every day regardless of workload. It is a 24-hour, 7-day/week, 365-days/year assignment with no significant differences in the security needed between the day and night shifts.

Exhibit 1
Jail Fixed-Post Staffing

Category	Result
Total Annual Hours	2,230
Total Unavailable Time	476
Net Annual Work Hours	1,754
Total Number of Fixed Post Positions	21
# of Hours/day Needing Coverage	24.5
# of Days/Week Needing Coverage	7
Total Hours of Coverage	187,278
Staff needed @ 21 fixed-post positions	106.8
Current staffing level	94
Number of positions over/(under) minimum	(12.8)

Net Available Work Hours (NAWH) (FY14-FY18 average)

At the time of the audit, 39 employees worked in the Field Division. Twenty-one employees worked in the court security section, and 18 employees worked in the warrant services section. After analyzing staffing numbers, it was concluded that the Field Division was short 11 positions, five positions in Court Security Section and six positions in the Warrant Services Section.

Exhibit 2**Court Security Fixed-Post Deputy Staffing**

Category	Result
Total Annual Hours	2,210
Total Unavailable Time	437
Net Annual Work Hours	1,773
# of Hours/day Needing Coverage	8.5
# of Days/Week Needing Coverage	5
Deputy Staff needed to cover 21 posts	46,410
Staff needed @ 21 fixed-post positions	26
Current Staffing level	21
Number of positions over/(under) minimum	(5)

Fixed-posts include courtroom security, door security, and control room.

Exhibit 3**Warrant Services Fixed-Post Deputy Staffing**

Category	Result
Total Annual Hours	2,230
Total Unavailable Time	365
Net Annual Work Hours	1,865
# of Hours/day Needing Coverage	12.25
# of Days/Week Needing Coverage	7
Deputy Staff needed to cover 10 Field posts	44,590
Staff needed @ 21 fixed-post positions	24
Current Staffing level	18
Number of positions over/(under) minimum	(6)

Two squads of 18 employees/each per day plus one employee on the warrant desk.

The Court Services Section workload is driven by two factors: securing the courthouse and providing security to the individual courts when in session. The courthouse has two controlled points of entry manned by Court Services staff when the building is open. Even though Court Services staff work an 8.5 hours/5 day/week schedule, staff is responsible for providing security for additional judicial programs. In the early 2000s, the first Accountability Court was established. Since that time, the accountability court program has expanded. For example, today Felony Drug Court, Veterans Court, Family Dependency Treatment Court, etc. are several courts established in Athens-Clarke County. The expansion of accountability courts has affected courtroom security staffing. According to staff interviews, court proceedings for accountability courts are normally held after 5 pm, and sometimes proceedings will continue until approximately 8 pm. It is important to note that the resources available to provide additional courtroom security are stretched, creating an unanticipated, negative operating impact on the SO's operating budget.

According to Exhibit 2, 26 full-time employees are necessary to provide security coverage over all the fixed posts in the courthouse. The Warrants and Civil Section had 18 employees working during this time; Exhibit 3 illustrates six additional employees or 24 full-time employees are necessary to cover all field post positions.



Athens-Clarke County Court House

The results of the survey along with exit interviews conducted by Human Resources and interviews conducted by Office of Operational Analysis staff indicated that the two main causes for the low staffing levels at the Sheriff's Office were recruitment and retention. Recruitment efforts need to be enhanced to attract new employees, and the following factors need to be addressed to improve retention:

- ◆ Low morale
- ◆ Safety concerns
- ◆ Lack of training
- ◆ Lack of faith and trust in leadership
- ◆ Fear of retaliation

Recruitment and Retention

There is a correlation between recruitment and retention as one affects the other, albeit indirectly. The Sheriff's Office is understaffed due to low retention and recruitment levels. The highest reduction in employees occurred in FY18. Due to separations (voluntary and involuntary), staffing was reduced 23 employees. Out of the 23 employees who separated, 20 (or 87%) worked in the Jail Division. Based on data collected, the turnover rate for the Sheriff's Office during the audit period averaged 12.6% (see Exhibit 4 below). The turnover rate is calculated by adding the number of new hires that failed to complete their probationary period to the number of employees who left for any reason and then dividing that number by the total number of employees at the highest staffing level for the fiscal year.


Exhibit 4:
Average Turnover Rate

	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	5-Year Average
TOTAL AUTHORIZED POSITIONS	183	191	194	194	194	191
Highest staffing level per fiscal year	164	162	173	174	175	169.6
New hires that did not complete the probationary period	1	5	5	3	6	4
Employees who left for any reason*	13	19	16	14	23	17
Turnover Rate	9%	15%	12%	10%	17%	12.6%
Retention Rate	91%	85%	88%	90%	83%	88%

*Includes all employees who left for voluntary or involuntary reasons: retirement, death, etc.


According to employee interviews, recruitment is the most important issue in the Sheriff's Office. Employees state recruitment levels are low due to lack of qualified applicants. Typically applicants are unqualified due to age (not meeting the minimum age requirement), drug history, excessive traffic citations, missing/contradictory application information, and failure to pass physical agility tests or psychological evaluations. This issue has led to understaffing. Exhibits 5 and 6 show the drastic disparity between the number of applications the Sheriff's Office receives and the number of actual candidates hired for both the Deputy Sheriff and Detention Officer positions.

**Exhibit 5:
Recruitment of Detention Officer Positions**



In FY16, the Detention Officer position was created; the initial application and physical agility test numbers were included in the Deputy Sheriff results. The two positions were separated beginning in FY17.

**Exhibit 6:
Recruitment of Deputy Sheriff Positions**



The Deputy Sheriff and Detention Officer positions are considered safety-sensitive. As such, the application process for these positions with the Sheriff's Office consists of the following stages: application, physical agility test, background check, interview, medical physical, psychological, and drug testing. Applicants that apply and meet the minimum qualifications are then scheduled for the Physical Agility Test (PAT). Background checks are completed on those who pass the PAT. If the applicant successfully clears the background check without being deferred, the applicant will be interviewed. After the interview, the Sheriff's Office determines whom they wish to make an offer of employment and those candidates are given a conditional offer based on their passing a physical, psychological evaluation, and a drug test. Candidates who have successfully passed all pre-employment screenings are then given a formal offer of employment and a start date.

The hiring process takes an average of five and a half months from the date Human Resources receives an application to the point where an applicant is hired.


The SO can improve retention of new employees by better educating applicants about the realities of the job. Employees are not given a realistic expectation of the job function and jail environment during the recruitment process. Presently, applicants are given a quick tour of the jail. This brief encounter of the jail is not sufficient for applicants to make an informed decision whether they would like to work as a Deputy within the jail. Under the current process, there is a stronger possibility of applicants with inflated expectations. There were survey respondents who stated that working at the SO is not what they expected. Not until after they are hired, provided three days of training, and eventually assigned to work in an area/unit of the jail alone do some employees realize they are not a good fit.

A common method for improving attrition is the implementation of a realistic job preview that offers both positive and negative aspects of the job to prospective candidates. The SO should integrate a realistic job preview of the environment and the job function during the recruitment/hiring process by scheduling adequate time for applicants to perform an observation of the activities within the jail during a shift. At the end of the recruitment process, the applicant should have a realistic picture of what will be required of them as well as what resources and opportunities will be made available to perform their duties.

In an evaluation of the SO's exit interviews over five years (FY14-FY18), the audit team found that nine percent of past employees left the SO due to lack of advancement opportunities. According to employee statements, they worked in the jail for a number of years and were never promoted or given the opportunity to transfer to either the Field or Administration Divisions. In the survey, 43% or 58 respondents indicated that the lack of advancement opportunities was one of the major issues prevalent in the SO. Lack of advancement leads to turnover despite training. Without an opportunity to advance/move up in the agency, employees (even those who have received training) are more likely to leave compared to those who have opportunities to advance in the organization. Exhibit 7 depicts additional issues that led to voluntary resignations.

Exhibit 7 Reasons for Voluntary Resignation

- Begin job elsewhere
- Moving out of area
- Family reasons
- Commuting distance
- Opportunity for advancement
- Better pay
- Better work conditions
- Supervision (Immediate)
- Lack of training



When asked in the survey if employees would be in support of an alternative work schedule, out of 137 respondents, 37.23% responded no, 24.09% responded yes, and 38.69% responded maybe. An alternative schedule is needed; it may positively improve attrition and retention rates. When asked to describe the type of work schedule that staff believes would work best, 18% of respondents stated that a 10-hour four-day shift would be beneficial and 8% stated an eight-hour work shift would be best. Eleven percent suggested that by simply changing the time frame of the shift from 8 am to 8 pm to either 6 am to 6 pm or 7 am to 7 pm, may improve morale by allowing employees more time with their families during daylight hours.

Overtime

The Fair Labor Standards Act requires sworn officers to receive overtime pay when they exceed 171 hours of work within a 28-day pay cycle. According to the survey, 53% of Sheriff's Office employees work 41-50 hours per week, and 27% of employees work over 51 hours per week meaning that 80% of the Sheriff's Office employees are working overtime. Due to high vacancy rates, the SO requires employees below the rank of Sergeant, to work mandatory overtime in the jail. Deputies in Court Services work Monday through Friday, leaving eight days a month available to work overtime on either a Saturday or Sunday.

Employees assigned to the Jail Division work on a 12.25-hour shift program (2-days on/2-days off; 3-days on) and so forth that equate to fourteen 12.25-hour days per month, as illustrated:

MON	TUE	WED	THR	FRI	SAT	SUN
ON	ON	OFF	OFF	ON	ON	ON
OFF	OFF	ON	ON	OFF	OFF	OFF
ON	ON	OFF	OFF	ON	ON	ON
OFF	OFF	ON	ON	OFF	OFF	OFF

Legend: **ON** **OFF**

This overtime is considered mandatory by the Sheriff's Office; however, the audit team found that the overtime requirement is not mandatory in the literal sense as employees who cannot or do not wish to work overtime can ask another employee to work their designated shift for them. If there is no other employee available to work in place of the designated employee, the designated employee is then mandated to work the required shift.

Scheduling overtime is poorly implemented and has not been adequately communicated to employees.

Some shifts within the jail schedule overtime for their employees a month in advance while others schedule overtime as needed. At the same time, the Field Division schedules its employees to work overtime in the jail. The supervisors of all divisions responsible for scheduling the overtime do not always communicate with each other, which has led to employees being scheduled, arriving to work, and being told to go home because they have sufficient people to work the shift.

Overtime is inconsistently processed between the Field and Jail Divisions. Employees who work overtime in the jail are paid time and a half their hourly rate of pay for any hours of overtime worked. The employees in the Field Division are required to time adjust overtime hours. Time adjusting when the shifts are already short-staffed compounds the issue even further. Employees have been advised that there is no money in the overtime budget for the Field Division because the funds are allocated to cover the overtime within the jail, thus resulting in the need for the time adjustments.

The total overtime expenditures for the Sheriff's Office for FY14–FY18 totaled \$5,916,560, which is 69% more than originally budgeted. Exhibit 8 depicts the amount of overtime that was used by each division. Issues with the overtime hours were addressed in the survey questions. While 35% of 134 respondents viewed excessive overtime hours as one of the major concerns within the Sheriff's Office, over 59% agreed that overtime work is a necessity.

Exhibit 8
Budgeted vs. Actual Overtime (\$)

Budgeted Overtime						
Division	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY14-FY18
Administration	\$8,000	\$8,000	\$8,000	\$8,000	\$8,000	\$40,000
Field	\$81,800	\$81,800	\$81,800	\$81,800	\$81,800	\$409,000
Jail	\$270,061	\$273,024	\$273,024	\$273,024	\$273,024	\$1,362,157
Total	\$359,861	\$362,824	\$362,824	\$362,824	\$362,824	\$1,811,157

Actual Overtime						
Division	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY14-FY18
Administration	\$5,955	\$7,181	\$7,970	\$8,142	\$4,567	\$33,815
Field	\$96,857	\$167,075	\$242,528	\$225,044	\$134,651	\$866,155
Jail	\$776,126	\$883,095	\$960,833	\$1,235,874	\$1,160,662	\$5,016,590
Total	\$878,939	\$1,057,350	\$1,211,331	\$1,469,060	\$1,299,880	\$5,916,560

To assist with the overtime and staffing issues that are plaguing the Sheriff's Office, the SO has implemented a reserve deputy program that should provide the much-needed assistance to the staff and reduce the overtime expenditures incurred by the Sheriff's Office.

Additional categories of coverage that must be anticipated and planned involves tasks coming up unexpectedly, but require staff attention. These include emergency medical transports, hospital security duty, special assignments, emergency events, mass arrests, power failure, emergency searches, mechanical failure, facility search, suicide/attempted suicide, funerals, high-risk court event, weather event, and more. These "details" consume many employee hours during the year, which should be anticipated in the budgeting process.

STAFFING RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 1:** Improve recruitment and retention efforts to reach total authorized levels. Coordinate with HR to finalize the reserve deputy program. Implement as an initiative for the next budget cycle. **This recommendation was implemented during the audit.**
- Recommendation 2:** Enhance recruitment efforts to attract qualified applicants.
- Recommendation 3:** Offer a realistic job preview during the hiring process.
- Recommendation 4:** Change the 12-hour shifts from 8-8 to possibly 6-6 or 7- 7. Or implement 8 or 10-hour shifts in place of 12-hour shifts.
- Recommendation 5:** Improve communication between divisions and supervisors regarding overtime schedules or have one person responsible for coordinating the overtime scheduling.
- Recommendation 6:** Some employees are paid overtime at the rate of time and a half, and others are required to time adjust for any overtime worked. Appropriate compensation of overtime pay or comp time earned instead of time adjusting when staffing levels are already reduced will help morale.

B. Training

Inadequate training, specifically in the Jail Division, is an important aspect affecting employee morale. Insufficient training is a major problem, particularly for new employees starting their career at the jail with no prior law enforcement or public safety experience.

“More training is needed to effectively complete our job task.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

It is important officers receive adequate training to protect themselves, those in their care, and the security of the agency as a whole. Morale will be low if officers are without adequate training to achieve these objectives. Survey respondents stated that training is rushed and not-comprehensive. Fifty-one percent of respondents stated that the lack of training and development is a major concern. One of the survey questions asked employees to describe the training they received. A wide variety of open-ended responses fell into one of three categories.

Survey Question: Describe the training you received for your current position.

Response: *“Hands on training with one of the best at my position at the time for 1 to 2 months.”*

Response: *“1 day observation. 3 days running it with trainer watching for each position.”*

Response: *“On the job. Very little concentration placed on learning due to shortage of staff and forbidden to have extra personnel due to money.”*

Response: *“I was assigned to the unit with another deputy. The first day I watched the other deputy. The second day they watched me. The third day I was by myself they checked on me 3 or 4 times, and after that, I was on my own.”*

Response: *“Mostly learned on my own and worked through the difficulty.”*

Response: *“Training usually consists of 3-5 days in which the trainee first watches the trainer, then the trainee gets more hands on, and lastly the trainer shadows the trainee.”*

Response: *“I was with a specific JTO and received a week of training in each area, with written performance evaluations that allowed me to assess areas of strength and areas of focus for improvement. However, since moving to the new jail, training has sharply declined. New deputies receive minimal training at best, often by unranked and uncertified deputies.”*

After a review of all survey responses, the audit team determined that no formal, comprehensive training program existed for new hires at the jail and current training efforts fell into one of the following three categories.

1. Employees received little to no training for their positions.
2. Employees received very extensive training in several areas/assignments for an extended period.
3. Employees received “on-the-job” training instead of a structured training curriculum.

New Hire Training

Survey responses were consistent with verbal comments expressed in interviews. New hires at the jail receive up to five days of training. The first day is spent observing another deputy working in a unit with 60 plus inmates, the second day the recruit will work the unit while the other deputy assists, and on the

third day, the recruit works the unit by themselves with the deputy simply observing the recruit. After the third day, the recruit is left alone to work the unit of 60 plus inmates without assistance.

The SO has a “jail first” policy, which requires all new employees seeking a career with the SO to begin their career in the jail. The impact of the “jail first” policy has the propensity to threaten staffing levels by creating an excessive turnover. Interviews indicate that newly hired employees can be easily intimidated in the jail environment. Perhaps, if the training were more comprehensive over a longer period, new officers would gain more confidence. While some employees may be able to tough it out until they get the hang of it, others are not as successful, as demonstrated by the steady turnover rate over the audit period.

Before the opening of the “new” jail, new hires received approximately three months of training before working in the jail. While the reason for the drastic change in training is unknown, a likely reason could be the lack of staff. In the survey, 17% of 131 survey respondents indicated, they received less than a week of training from the Sheriff’s Office.

After working in the jail a few months, new hires receive their Jailer Certification. The Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) certification is not required for deputies upon hire, but they are mandated to be certified typically within 18 to 24 months following their start date. The Sheriff’s Office conducts some on-the-job training for new hires; however, not an adequate amount of quality training.

“Training usually consists of 3-5 days in which the trainee first watches the trainer, then the trainee gets more hands on and lastly the trainer shadows the trainee.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

The lack of job growth and learning opportunities hurt employee morale. There are very few opportunities for job growth or cross-training for employees working at the jail. After two years, employees are eligible to apply for promotional opportunities. Many employees are interested in working in the Field Division. Due to the number of limited positions in the Field Division, the “jail first” policy creates turmoil for employees in the Jail Division who are eager to advance or try something different. The length of time between when new employees begin work at the jail and when they have an opportunity to transfer to the Field Division can range from two years into perpetuity. Employees work in inmate housing units for months and even years before they are offered an opportunity to work intake, release, classification, programs, or other positions in the jail.


In October 2017, the *Successful Implementation of a Jail Training Officer Program in the Clarke County Jail* guide was updated by the Sheriff’s Office. This document explains the functions of the Jail Training Officer (JTO) program and the process of training new jail personnel. New jail employees go through training comprised of nine different phases. Phases 1-7 are considered core training and are to be completed upon hiring. Phases 8-9 of the new hire training are to be completed within two years of an employee’s start date. The core training alternates time spent training directly with a JTO and time spent training individually. Totalling all core training time, new employees spend 14 days training with a JTO and 17 days of training individually. Dependent on the work schedule, new employees can spend one to three months in core training.

Additionally, all JTOs that train new hires are required to have at least two years of working experience in the jail. The survey and interviews indicate that although the JTO program was recently updated, there are requirements in the JTO program and new hire training that are currently not being implemented. In the interviews, it was mentioned that the JTO program is being redeveloped. Survey respondents also mentioned that they received their new hire training with employees with less than one year of experience working in the jail. The current new hire jail training is completed within three days, as opposed to the one to three months under the JTO program. The Sheriff’s Office is not abiding by the JTO program updated in October 2017, which is creating insufficient training of new jail personnel. When new jail personnel is not trained appropriately, their safety and the safety of other jail employees are compromised. Insufficient training of new hires also decreases morale and confidence for the new hires.

Sixty-four percent of respondents feel jail security requires additional training and development.

Exhibit 9

Q: What areas do you think require additional training and development in the SO? Select all that apply.



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Maintaining jail security	64.57%	82
Communication Skills	64.57%	82
Supervision or Management Skills	53.54%	68
Computer/Software/Technology	50.39%	64
Defensive tactics	48.03%	61
Processing warrants and civil papers	47.24%	60
Ethics	43.31%	55
Sheriff's Office Policies and Procedures	40.16%	51
Maintaining court security	36.22%	46
Athens-Clarke County policies and procedures	31.50%	40
Harassment and discrimination prevention	27.56%	35
Total Respondents:	92.03%	127

Inadequate staffing levels is a challenge in the Sheriff's Office. Staffing issues affect all areas in the jail, especially training. **Insufficient staffing in the jail is resulting in a lack of experienced employees available to train new hires.**

New hires in the jail are now typically provided three to five days of training before working alone in an individual unit. Based on the JTO program, new hires are expected to be trained by a JTO. According to the *Successful Implementation of a Jail Training Officer Program in the Clarke County Jail* document that was updated in October 2017:

- ◆ JTOs should hold a rank position coinciding as closely as possible to the trainee. Sergeants and Lieutenants should not be eligible for the position of JTO, since the trainee will probably be intimidated more by a supervisor than a "fellow" deputy, to the detriment of the training process.
- ◆ JTOs should have at least two years of working experience in the jail in which they are training.
- ◆ JTOs should have an above-average to outstanding work record, possess above average to outstanding academic and communication skills, and be willing and able to maintain an excellent attendance record, regardless of the shift to which assigned.
- ◆ JTOs should possess a good working knowledge of agency rules, regulations, and facility design to train new employees effectively.

Survey responses indicate the Sheriff's Office relies heavily on computer-based training to meet P.O.S.T. certification requirements. In the state of Georgia, law enforcement officers and jail officers who obtain P.O.S.T. (Peace Officer Standards and Training) certification are required to complete a minimum of 20 hours of training per year. The survey and interviews revealed that Sheriff's Office sworn officers complete a majority of the minimum of 20 hours of training primarily through online training classes.

When employees were asked for suggestions to improve training, 21% of survey respondents indicated that they want either a wider variety of classes or instructor-led classes. Seemingly, online training is a positive option for the SO as computer-based training minimally affects staffing. There is an over-reliance on online training. An over-reliance on online courses may lead to a lack of understanding by Sheriff's Office employees. To properly master certain skills, in-person, instructor-led training is required. SO employees stated classes such as defensive tactics, verbal judo, and use of force taught by on-site instructors are more valuable than taking these courses online. Employees expressed the desire to interact with an instructor to gain immediate feedback when questions arise during certain training classes.


Favoritism was among the top seven issues the audit team learned of during the audit. According to audit interviews and survey respondent comments, evidence of favoritism is prevalent in the Sheriff's Office, especially in terms of better training opportunities and employee promotions. Fifteen percent of the audit interviews stated favoritism was a serious issue within the SO. When asked to elaborate, some employees said that favoritism is conducted through training, development, and promotions. Exhibit 10 indicates that over half of the employees believe that favoritism is shown towards certain employees by supervisors and command staff. Throughout the free response questions of the survey, favoritism was mentioned 46 times. Eleven of the free response answers in the survey mentioned that favoritism plays a role in training and promotions. On-site training (e.g., classes offered through GPSTC, GSA, jailer school, etc.) is not offered to all SO employees consistently. Respondents said that additional training is offered to "select" people, which prepares them for promotional opportunities or the ability to transfer to another position to enhance their skills. Inconsistent training for employees may cause serious morale concerns. Employees in the Sheriff's Office are facing morale concerns in the area of training due to their desire to be trained. In the survey, employees responded to a question asking what the SO could do to improve training. Fifty-four percent of respondents stated an increase in training opportunities and training hours would improve morale in the Sheriff's Office. Responses varied, including offering more training to all employees, increasing the new hire training time, increasing instructor-led training opportunities, and offering a wider variety of training courses.

To combat favoritism in training, administrative staff and supervisors must make additional training available to Sheriff's Office employees on every level a priority. A possible challenge to this recommendation is staffing decrease that could result when employees are away from work for training. Despite this challenge, the pros outweigh the cons of offering more training to all employees.

Exhibit 10 Favoritism

Q26: Do you believe the supervisory teams (up to and including the Sheriff) show favoritism towards certain employees?

Answered: 138 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	56.52%	78
No	22.46%	31
Somewhat	21.01%	29
TOTAL		138

Exhibit 11 shows the cyclical process of offering additional training for employees. By offering additional training, employee morale and confidence will increase, which would also increase employees ability to conduct their work functions properly. An increase in morale and employee confidence subsequently decreases employee turnover. A decrease in employee turnover will stabilize staffing levels. Stable staffing levels coupled with an increase in recruitment will allow more employees the opportunity to receive specialized training.

Exhibit 11 Cyclical Process of Additional Training



Job-Related Training

According to survey responses and comments expressed in interviews, supervisors have not implemented a uniform approach to policy briefings. Supervisors in the Jail Division, representing all four shifts, have shown a lack of supervisory and communication skills. According to survey responses, jail supervisors, communicate policies to subordinates inconsistently. There is a mixture of direct and indirect methods. It is at the supervisor's discretion, which method, email, Power DMS, handouts, or verbal briefings at the beginning of the shift, they use to communicate policies. Also, deputies receive critical information via word of mouth from coworkers or when an employee is disciplined. This inconsistency can erode the cohesion between jail deputies and lead to increased risks of incidents being mishandled. Supervisors are also micromanaging employees because they are out of touch with the frontline activity in the jail. Circumstances between inmate-deputy interactions may become complex, and supervisors do not give proper attention to the issue if they feel it is not important. Supervisors must communicate policies consistently, clearly, and fairly; if not, inmates may feel emboldened to act out if they know certain deputies will not be supported.

The best way to ensure adequate leadership behavior in the future is to implement quality leadership training today. Supervisory training is needed to help advance those who wish to attain promotions. Existing supervisory personnel need to encourage the growth and development of existing staff to become future leaders within the Sheriff's Office by providing coaching, guidance, and the opportunity to observe and perform some of the functions of the supervisor. Job-related leadership training is not provided to the staff. As indicated by 50% of survey respondents, lack of training and development is a top concern. Online instruction is available for deputies, but many attest that this is not sufficient for learning leadership skills. More in-person and classroom methods are strongly preferred, especially on the topic of high-liability inmate situations. There is also an association between low supervisory training and the new jail. Some attest that the new facility does not allow for training opportunities because of the increased size and consequent demand for more posts.

There are employees currently working in the Sheriff's Office who hold training certifications that employees new and established, could benefit from immediately. Some of the courses include,

- ◆ General instructor
- ◆ JTO (Jail Training Officer) instructor
- ◆ Defensive tactics instructor
- ◆ Taser instructor
- ◆ CPR instructor
- ◆ Firearms instructor

The audit team cannot think of a reason why the Sheriff's Office is not utilizing these valuable training resources of staff members who are certified instructors to conduct in-house training for their own instructional and training needs.

Training Discrepancies between Divisions

There is a significant difference in the length of training offered to employees in the Jail Division compared to employees in the Field Division.

A review of exit interviews and survey responses revealed that new employees were quick to resign because they did not feel confident or prepared to work alone in the jail after three to five days of training.

New employees of the SO begin their career in the Jail Division. Currently, newly hired employees receive up to five days of training before they are assigned to an area or unit in the jail to work alone.

The Field Division, which in most cases, is considered a promotional opportunity, consists of employees who have

worked at the jail for at least two years. When an employee is transferred or promoted to the Field Division, they receive three months of training before they are assigned to work alone.

The audit team verified that employees in the Field Division receive three months of training before they are allowed to work on their own. Although currently, the Field Division is much smaller than the Jail Division, both areas are short-staffed. Despite the staffing-shortage, which can interrupt the training within the Field Division, all employees are still required to receive three months of mandatory training. The length of training offered is significantly different between the Jail Division and the Field Division. Throughout audit interviews, the audit team noticed morale issues such as safety and favoritism were discussed more amongst jail interviews than field interviews. Training is considered a higher priority in the Field Division than in the Jail Division; thus, morale is higher amongst field deputies than jail deputies. To improve employee morale in the jail, the SO should re-establish the JTO, or Jail Training Officer program, which consist of one to three months of mandatory training.

Training is inconsistent throughout each shift in the jail. Inconsistency was mentioned throughout the survey and audit interviews. Survey respondents and employee interviews indicated that each shift and even each supervisor tends to train subordinates using their interpretation of SO policies and procedures. Employees trained on one shift and subsequently transferred to a different shift have a higher chance of getting reprimanded due to a different interpretation of the policies and procedures.

TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 7:** Provide in-depth training to new hires and abide by the JTO program that was last updated in October 2017.
- Recommendation 8:** Training should be conducted in accordance with the JTO guidelines last updated in October 2017. Training Officers should have a minimum of two years of experience working as a Deputy within the CCSO before training new hires.
- Recommendation 9:** Increase in-person training sessions and utilize qualified staff members to provide professional development courses.
- Recommendation 10:** Provide and support training and career development opportunities for all employees.
- Recommendation 11:** Provide training to supervisory and management staff on communication skills - both verbal and written, and supervisory skills.
- Recommendation 12:** Existing supervisory personnel need to train their employees to become supervisors by allowing them to observe and perform leadership duties.
- Recommendation 13:** Utilize more job-specific sources in training, including JTO instructor, defensive tactics, Taser, CPR, firearms, and general instruction.
- Recommendation 14:** Increase Jail Division training to more closely reflect Field Division training both in length of time and in-depth coverage.
- Recommendation 15:** Supervisors' interpretations of policies and procedures must be made uniform across divisions so that transferring employees will have clear, non-contradictory instruction on how to perform their duties.

C. Safety and Security

Safety

The CCSO follows a direct supervision management philosophy at the jail, which places officers directly within the inmate living area, or housing unit and provides officers immediate visual observation and continual interaction with each of the inmates. The direct supervision approach to inmate management has gained wide acceptance across the country as the preferred inmate management style in midsize to large jail facilities. Because of the constant, proactive monitoring of the inmates, incidents of inmate violence, vandalism, and disruptive behavior reportedly occur at minimal levels. A major concept of direct supervision is to offer as many activities and programs as possible within or adjacent to the housing unit. Otherwise, inmate movement outside the housing unit must be monitored by other staff unless all inmates in the unit are moving out of the unit. Employees working in the jail are concerned about their safety. For example, when asked in the employee engagement survey to identify any major concerns employees have within the Sheriff's Office, 134 out of 139 employees selected jail safety. Comments from the audit interviews and exit interviews also revealed that employees view safety as a serious issue within the jail. The Clarke County Jail's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual details the disciplinary actions that inmates are subject to receive dependent on the rule violation (See Appendix G). Each violation is given a specific required disciplinary time. The disciplinary time from the violations is subject to change based on the nature and number of incidents of an inmate. The audit team learned in audit interviews that often, disciplinary sanctions imposed on inmates violating the rules are reversed or reduced in time when the disciplinary unit (Unit 11) is overcapacity. Despite possible conditions for changes in disciplinary time, the survey revealed that changes in disciplinary time happen frequently. Inmate disciplinary actions are applied inconsistently. When asked if actions are taken against inmates for acts of violence against staff, 39.1% of respondents stated that inmates are given minimal to no disciplinary time. Respondents also said that in the situations inmates receive disciplinary time, the time required based on SOPs is reduced by supervisors and administrative staff. Thirteen employees in the audit interviews revealed that they faced a situation where disciplinary time an inmate received for a policy violation was reversed by a supervisor. Twelve separate respondents indicated that inmates "run the jail." Responses from the survey and audit interviews reveal that changes in inmates' disciplinary time happen on more than just an occasional basis. Altering inmate disciplinary sanctions decreases employee morale; conversely, altering inmate disciplinary sanctions increases inmates' confidence to violate jail rules. Increased violation of jail rules by inmates puts the safety of jail employees at risk. To increase morale and maintain the safety of staff, other inmates, and jail employees, disciplinary time enforced on inmates should consistently mirror disciplinary time stipulated in SOPs. The lack of adherence to the policies emboldens the inmates and undermines the authority of the deputies within the units.

"The inmates disrespect staff at will with little or no recourse at all. Inmates are allowed to curse, threaten, and physically attack deputies with weak disciplinary action."

~Anonymous Survey Respondent

After three to five days of training, new hires are assigned to a housing unit of 60 plus inmates alone. For some individuals, this may not be an issue; however, for others, the lack of training and skill development can create a safety concern for the employee and the inmates. New hires do not receive adequate training to develop the confidence necessary to work the housing units alone in the jail.



The Clarke County jail is a direct supervision facility, which means that inmates are not separated into individual cells; all inmates are out in the unit at one time. Without proper oversight by the deputy assigned to the unit, the inmates can take advantage of the new hire if the new hire is uncomfortable in the setting or if the new hire shows that they are uncertain of their level of authority.

Throughout the interview and survey phase of the audit, safety concerns in the jail were addressed. Approximately 63% of 134 survey respondents said that safety in the jail is a major concern. Reasons respondents indicated included understaffing, improper

training, lack of disciplinary actions taken against inmates, lack of supervisory assistance, and the open dorm layout of the jail. Respondents advised that there are deputies within the jail who will not enforce rules because it can lead to a confrontation with an inmate or the deputy believes that the administration will fail to support their decision.

The Athens-Clarke County Human Resources Department provided the Office of Operational Analysis with 27 exit interviews from FY14 to FY18 (through December 2018). The exit interviews reflected 20 reasons for voluntary resignation from the Sheriff's Office. In the exit interviews provided, 17% of the former employees indicated they left the Sheriff's Office due to a new job opportunity. Thirteen percent indicated they resigned due to better working conditions. When asked to elaborate on these responses, respondents explained that overtime was a main contributor to the difficult working conditions they faced in the Sheriff's Office. Deputies working excessive overtime hours have a higher propensity to experience fatigue and burnout during their shifts, which can lead to safety issues. Studies have shown that overtime is one of the main causes of fatigue and burnout in law enforcement. The National Safety Council has indicated that some of the main causes of fatigue include shift work, high-risk hours, demanding jobs, long shifts, rotating shifts, long weeks, sleep loss, no rest breaks, quick shift returns, and long commutes. Several of the main causes of fatigue listed apply to employees within the Sheriff's Office. Most employees in the Sheriff's Office do shift work in which they work 12.25 hours and work mandatory overtime. This type of work schedule puts employees at risk for sleep deprivation and fatigue. Throughout the audit interviews, employees stated that they do not get breaks when working in the Sheriff's Office. Breaks are essential for employees to recuperate from their work, especially for high-stress fields such as law enforcement. The survey revealed issues concerning the lack of lunch breaks in the Sheriff's Office. To ensure the safety of employees, the SO should implement more measures to decrease fatigue among employees.

Possible measures could include a break schedule for every shift, a policy limiting the amount of overtime each employee can work per month, and a policy that limits the amount of hours employees can work at other jobs separate from the Sheriff's Office.

When asked about ways to improve supervisor-employee relations, employees mentioned receiving a lunch break would improve these relations. During audit interviews, employees mentioned that they either never or rarely receive breaks during their 12.25-hour shift. According to Policy 9030.20 in the Jail SOPs, the Unit Support Officer is responsible for providing one 30-minute break and two 15-minute breaks to the Housing Unit Officers. These causes of fatigue within the Sheriff's Office can ultimately lead to safety issues. According to the National Safety Council, a person that loses two hours of sleep from a normal eight-hour sleep cycle performs at the same rate as someone who has had three beers. Decreased cognitive functions of SO employees prevent them from being completely alert during their shifts. Decreased alertness increases the likelihood of work-related incidents.

Survey results contradicted the information provided by those who had completed exit interviews. When asked if overtime work negatively influenced productivity during normal or overtime shifts, 52.94% of respondents said no. In both the survey and the interviews, employees stated that there were no issues with receiving time off when requested. When leave is requested in advance, 84.78% of employees responded that they are approved the leave time they requested with 45.65% of respondents stating that they take two to three weeks of leave annually.

Maintaining safety at the jail is critical. Unexpected and dangerous situations can and do arise. For example, during this audit, an individual drove up to the jail, exited his vehicle, and committed suicide by shooting himself in the head. What would have happened if that person had chosen to enter the jail with the weapon hidden in a pocket or waistband, and the waiting area in the lobby was full? There are no metal detectors upon entry to the jail lobby. The front doors of the jail are open, and the lights in the front lobby remain on 24 hours a day, seven days a week. All of these factors pose safety concerns and increase the likelihood of contraband, such as weapons, cell phones, or drugs, etc. entering the jail.

Components of jail operations are unsafe and expose the entire jail to possible security threats. When asked what areas need additional training and development, 64.57% of employees stated that maintaining jail security needs development.

In the audit interviews, employees addressed jail security specifically related to the unsafe nature of the Clarke County Jail lobby. Jail entrance procedures can be found in Appendix H. Based on observations of the jail, the lobby is secured by one deputy at the front desk. In contrast, the Courthouse has metal detectors located at two points of entry to the building. Allowing the front doors of the jail to remain open 24-hours a day, increases the likelihood for a breach of security. Especially outside of the jail's visitation hours; there is no need for access to the lobby 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Lawyers that go to the jail to meet with clients do so during visitation hours. Law enforcement officials bring detainees into the jail through the law enforcement entrance located at the side of the building, directly into intake. Employees in the audit interviews suggested that having the front desk of the jail lobby directly adjacent to the glass doors is unsafe. In the case of a serious security threat, the deputy who works at the front desk is most susceptible to harm. One deputy assigned to the front desk of the jail is not sufficient because of the various duties they are responsible for, such as answering phones, opening doors, and assisting visitors of the jail. It is worth mentioning that the public entrance to the jail does not have automated doors or provide a manual button for opening the doors. Automation of the doors is not a requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), but it is recommended for entrance doors where the opening force is significant. Currently, if there is a visitor to the jail in a wheelchair that is struggling to open the doors, the deputy is required to leave their post and walk to the doors to open them for the individual. A button at the entrance that would assist the visitor with opening the doors would be beneficial to the jail and would be one less task for the deputy to oversee in the lobby. Efforts should be made to ensure safety within the jail lobby. Installation of metal detectors at the front doors into the lobby, locking of the front doors after visitation hours, and an additional

"The safety at the jail is my main concern; the front lobby is not safe."

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

deputy at the front desk lobby are considerations that could be implemented to ensure security.

Apart from inmate visitation, the jail receives visitors for volunteer purposes. Volunteer and Professional visitation procedures can be found in Appendix I. Separate from volunteers, the jail has two official internship programs for Master of Social Work students and Criminal Justice students. According to the Sheriff's Office *Professional and Volunteer Visitors Policy* (General Order 9051.03), all volunteers and visitors are required to provide valid photo identification upon entry of the jail. This policy also states that all volunteers, visitors, and student interns are required to apply for approval for volunteer status through the Programs Office of the jail and submit to an approval process including a criminal records background check. The *Criminal Justice Internship Program Policy* (General Order 7010.05) indicates that background checks are required for the internship, and many of the background checks are conducted by the Sheriff's Office. According to the *Entrance Procedures Policy* (General Order 9030.06), all professional visitor's backpacks/briefcases are required to be visually inspected for contraband. Volunteers related to inmate programming are not required to follow the established visitation policy, nor do they undergo background screening. Despite the various policies surrounding volunteers and student interns, employees during the audit interviews revealed that the policies are not implemented in the jail. Interviewees indicated that background checks for volunteers and student interns are inconsistent in that certain people receive background checks and others do not. Interviewees also explained that visual inspection of professional volunteers' bags does not occur. The audit team, while waiting within the lobby to conduct interviews of jail staff, witnessed this lack of practice. Inconsistent background checks and a lack of bag inspections expose the jail to a variety of safety concerns. One of the safety concerns is contraband. If volunteers and interns do not go through the proper inspection, contraband can be transferred unknowingly between inmates and volunteers, leading to serious security threats.

To prevent serious security threats, the Sheriff's Office should more strictly enforce existing policies concerning volunteers and student interns. The Sheriff's Office should also provide more detail to policies concerning volunteers and student interns such as requiring a deputy present in all program meetings, background checks performed by the Sheriff's Office on all professional and volunteers to include student interns, and a deadline to submit all background checks.

Security

In the jail, critical positions such as victors are vital for ensuring the safety of deputies. Whenever a deputy in the housing unit needs assistance or needs to be relieved, a victor is responsible for relieving the deputy.

Victors also work to transport inmates to different areas of the jail. Although the victors are required to do these things, comments within the audit

interviews suggest these functions are not happening. Approximately nine of the audit interviews mentioned that victors are often not working or are taken off their post to cover another area. Audit interviews also mentioned that for an average seven-day workweek, victors are not present four days

out of the week during the night shift. This is an issue considering there should be at least two victors on every shift in the jail. Not having a victor present to assist deputies is a safety issue. In the case that a deputy is involved in an altercation with an inmate, victors are assigned to help that deputy. When victors are reassigned to another job assignment, it removes the only position whose priority is to serve, as the first responder should a dangerous circumstance arise. Due to staffing shortages, critical positions whose main responsibility is the safety of deputies in the jail are typically the first to be reassigned to a different function. More Victors are necessary if jail leadership continues the practice of reassigning them to fill in for staffing shortages. One victor should be responsible for transferring inmates, and another should be responsible for assisting/relieving deputies. Additionally, victors should remain at their posts when not providing assistance or transferring inmates. When victors are removed from their posts, they are unable to respond to deputies promptly during emergencies.

"I feel the people who are supposed to have my back in an incident will not. . . We also run the jail short staffed quite regularly, which puts a big damper on morale and safety. When the jail is ran short you have less people to respond as backup"

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent


Currently, there are not enough deputies to support the current number of inmates adequately. Staffing shortages in the Jail Division are resulting in improper jail security.

Exhibit 12 shows that there has been a steady reduction of inmates in the jail from FY14 to FY17. During this period, staffing levels have also decreased. While a decrease in inmate population alleviates the workload of deputies in the housing units, several posts within the facility must still be manned at all times to maintain jail operations, regardless of the inmate population. In essence, this means that staffing levels for mandatory posts must still be maintained despite fewer inmates.

If the Sheriff's Office continues to lose more employees within the jail, a Federal Government takeover could occur. Federal takeovers of jails typically happen when a lawsuit is filed against the jail. The possibility for federal action increases if a lawsuit is granted class-action status by a US District Court Judge. Continuous, inadequate staffing will increase the likelihood that this type of legal action will be taken against the jail.

To ensure the safety of Sheriff's Office employees and inmates, staffing levels in the jail must increase over time.

Exhibit 12
Average Inmate Population




The jail's increase in size, relative to the decline in employees, has also been a factor affecting employee safety. In November 2015, Athens-Clarke County completed construction on the new county jail. The new jail facility is approximately 208,000 square feet, in contrast to the old facility, which was 115,000 square feet (see Appendix F). Despite the increase in jail size, the amount of employees working the jail has not increased. With an increase in separations, having a larger jail facility with fewer employees makes it more challenging for deputies to supervise inmates properly. Exhibit 13 shows that approximately 94% of respondents in the survey felt that shifts at the jail were insufficiently staffed to support the number of inmates or the activity level in the jail. Difficulties in inmate supervision can lead to riots, inmate on inmate assaults, inmate on deputy assaults, deputy burnout, and other safety threats.

Exhibit 13
Staffing of Jail Shifts

Q68: In your opinion, are shifts at the jail staffed sufficiently to support the number of inmates or the activity level in the jail?

Answered: 124 Skipped: 15



ANSWER CHOICES		RESPONSES	
Yes		4.84%	6
No		91.94%	114
Not sure		3.23%	4
TOTAL			124

SAFETY & SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 16:** Disciplinary actions need to be explicitly communicated in SOP's and understood by all supervisory and subordinate staff members and then applied consistently.
- Recommendation 17:** Training should be longer than three days, and new hires should have a clear understanding of their authority before they are exposed to large groups of inmates.
- Recommendation 18:** Additional housing units should not be opened until staffing reaches optimal levels.
- Recommendation 19:** Recruitment and retention levels must be improved to reduce the number of overtime hours needed to provide adequate coverage of all security posts. If needed, overtime should be spread to all available personnel to limit the amount of excessive overtime any staff member has to experience.
- Recommendation 20:** Install metal detectors at the front doors of the lobby, lock the front doors after visitation hours, place an additional deputy at the front desk, and move the front desk so that it is not in a direct sightline of the front doors.
- Recommendation 21:** Jail personnel needs to follow the Visitation/Programming Policy regarding volunteers and student interns accessing the jail.
- Recommendation 22:** There should be two victors assigned per shift, one transferring inmates and one assisting deputies in the pods. If coverage is needed for an inmate outside of the jail, deputies from non-security posts, such as laundry detail, should be used to cover as needed.
- Recommendation 23:** Recruitment and retention must be improved to assure proper coverage of all security posts within the jail.

D. Morale and Leadership

Leadership can affect employee morale, motivation, stress level, and overall agency commitment. The employee survey offers a correlation between the lack of strong leadership practices in the SO and negative effects on employee morale. Some statements make a clear mention of low morale due to poor leadership practices and a corresponding decline in retention and recruitment. Leadership must evolve into supporting staff by making them a part of the team that has an opinion in the way to achieve agency goals and objectives.

Survey Question: *What do you like least about your job in the Sheriff's Office?*

Response: *"Nothing comes to mind, love the job, and have loved it for the past 30 plus years."*

Response: *"The poor leadership and unsafe work conditions due to staffing."*

Response: *"No support from administration."*

Response: *"The constant disregard for following SOP and the obvious morality flaws in some of the employees."*

Response: *"The lack of leadership, major safety issues being ignored, staffing problems."*

Response: *"Inconsistency, very poor management from the top, secrecy, mistrust of top management, lying, double standards."*

Response: *"Wonderful work environment."*

Response: *"Feels like the inmates are more in control of the jail than we are. They seem to get what they want. Many inmates say our jail is like a daycare for them and easy."*

Response: *"I don't have any dislikes."*

Response: *"One Captain will take the easy way out of a situation instead of following the written directives and policies for this agency."*

Morale

Feeling valued is a basic human need. Good behavior, if it is recognized, is more likely to be repeated. Leaders must create opportunities to recognize good behavior of employees during shift briefings, amongst peers, and during watch commander meetings with senior leadership or command staff. Leadership should recognize good job performance and also foster the ability for employees to express any concerns they have openly without fear of retaliation.


Employees expressed they cannot communicate honestly with their supervisors about workplace concerns. Approximately 54% of employees fear retaliation from their supervisor if they report a sensitive issue or concern. The same percentage felt that they could not speak honestly about issues or concerns with supervisory staff up to and including the Sheriff.

Exhibit 14

Inability to Speak Honestly with Supervisors

Q24: Do you believe you can speak honestly with the supervisory teams (up to and including the Sheriff) about issues and concerns that you experience in the workplace?

Answered: 136 Skipped: 3



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	25.00%	34
No	54.41%	74
Somewhat	20.59%	28
TOTAL		136

Approximately 52% of respondents indicated they fear that disciplinary actions will be taken against them for any actions they take in the jail. Fear of retaliation and reprisal was mentioned 24 times throughout the

“Stop leading by intimidation. Stop making people feel their jobs are in jeopardy from fear of retaliation.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

free response answers of the survey. When asked to provide additional context to free response answers, respondents said they fear retaliation when disciplining inmates. As indicated in Exhibit 15, approximately 54% of


respondents indicated that they are concerned that a supervisor might retaliate against them for reporting a sensitive issue. To increase morale and to create a safer working environment for jail employees, the SO should create a new policy that communicates zero tolerance for retaliation against jail employees for disciplining inmates who violate policies and procedures. Additionally, the SO should clarify acceptable deviations from the inmate disciplinary policy in the SOPs.

Approximately 76% of respondents selected poor morale as the biggest concern amongst staff (Exhibit 16). Morale is low in part due to leadership, lack of training, safety concerns, and mandatory overtime.

Exhibit 15 Concerns Regarding Retaliation

Q23: Are you concerned that the supervisory teams (up to and including the Sheriff) might retaliate if you reported a sensitive issue or concern?

Answered: 138 Skipped: 1




ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	54.35%	75
No	24.64%	34
Somewhat	21.01%	29
TOTAL		138

Exhibit 16 Major Concerns with Sheriff's Office

Q7 Please identify any major concerns you have within the Sheriff's Office. Select all that apply.

Answered: 134 Skipped: 4



Additional concerns provided by respondents in the comments sections of Question 7 in the employee engagement survey include:

- ◆ the current Sick Leave Abuse Policy
- ◆ mandatory overtime
- ◆ lack of instructional training offered to all staff members
- ◆ safety concerns within the jail
- ◆ lack of trust in the leadership, including commandstaff
- ◆ lack of leadership support
- ◆ fear of intimidation and retaliation by leadership, including command staff
- ◆ perception of favoritism and inconsistent discipline throughout the department

During the employee engagement survey and in-person interviews, the audit team learned that employee disciplinary policies were not enforced consistently.

The audit team conducted a review of 153 disciplinary action reports provided by the SO and Human Resources for the audit period. Of the 153 actions, 100 were written reprimands issued for Code of Conduct violations and abuse of sick leave. The audit team learned disciplinary policies are not enforced consistently for similar facts and circumstances among staff. For example, one individual who was disciplined for an egregious violation of policies and procedures was given a written reprimand, yet another employee with a very similar infraction was suspended for three days. Such discrepancies in the enforcement of policies breed distrust of leadership and contribute to the belief of favoritism within the SO.

The Sheriff's Office implemented a blanket policy regarding sick leave abuse in 2016. This policy, administered as is, has proven ineffective and a contributing factor to poor morale. The policy being

"Remove the sick leave abuse policy or make it case by case. If you are a good supervisor you know who is abusing sick leave and who is not."

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

enforced is a combination of one sentence from the Athens-Clarke

County Leave of Absence Policy ("Sick leave is not to be considered a right that employees may use at their discretion, but a privilege not to be abused."), the Sheriff's Office Leave Usage Policy, and a Leave Usage Policy that the Transportation and Public Works Department has on record.

Employees of the Sheriff's Office perceive the Sick Leave Abuse Policy and enforcement as a form of punishment and retaliation. In the survey, when asked for additional comments, respondents referenced the SO Sick Leave Abuse Policy as destroying morale, creating an unsafe work environment (due to illness), causing resentment, and creating a hostile work environment. According to the Sheriff's Office Sick Leave Abuse Policy, any employee who works an eight-hour shift and accumulates over 40 hours of sick leave or works a 12-hour shift and accumulates over 60 hours of sick leave (excluding FMLA) within a year is considered as having abused their leave. If an employee exceeds the 40 hour or 60-hour sick leave requirement, going forward they are required to obtain a doctor's note to excuse them from work for each time they are out due to an illness, injury, or doctor's appointment. If no note is provided, even if they have accumulated leave time, the Sheriff's Office will consider the scheduled work time missed as unapproved time away from work

"Anything over 40 hours is considered abusive sick leave; you will receive a Gold Sheet. To put in for FMLA doctor's offices charge you a fee. If you get the flu and you're out for 3 days that is already 36 hours. So, don't be getting sick in the Sheriff's Office with or without a doctor's note."

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

and the employee will not receive compensation for the time in which they were away. The employee will also be advised

that failure to furnish the required doctor's note again, may lead to further disciplinary action up to and including termination.

The audit team confirmed that the Sheriff's Office implemented this policy to deter those who were mandated to work overtime from calling out sick when the shifts were already short-staffed. Unfortunately, this has proven to punish everyone for the actions of a few. When the policy was implemented, 29 employees received notification of violating the policy. The total sick leave taken for the Sheriff's Office in FY15 was 7,164.22 hours – these were the hours used to determine the need for the policy. The most recent leave totals for FY18 show that the policy has not had the desired effect; the total sick leave taken has increased to 10,059.13 hours. The Sick Leave Abuse Policy has not achieved its desired effect. Exhibit 17 depicts the overall sick leave usage by the Sheriff's Office employees for FY14 to FY18.

It is a fact that health declines with age; this policy negatively affects those employees who have longevity with the Sheriff's Office and those who have to care for family members who are ill or injured. It has also proven to encourage employees who are ill to come to work even though they may be contagious, and the disease could spread to co-workers, inmates, and visitors. The negativity of this policy adds stress to an already stressful work environment, which in itself promulgates health issues.

Exhibit 17
Sick Leave Usage FY14-FY18



Sections of Leave Usage Policy, Sections II A. 1, 2, 3, and Section II B. 2, adopted by the Sheriff's Office, should be updated to align with the Athens-Clarke County Leave Policy, Section 1-9-7 (c) and with HIPPA regulations.

Section II A. 1. of the SO Leave Usage Policy states, “In cases of illness or injury, members shall notify their immediate supervisor as early as is practical to obtain permission, and allow adjustments in the assignment schedule, and under the following regulations:”

To obtain permission infers that the supervisor has knowledge about the extent of the employee's illness or has medical training to determine if the employee should be allowed to stay out of work when ill or if their illness is insignificant enough that the employee should still report to work. The Sheriff's Office Leave Usage Policy needs to be revised. The words “to obtain permission” should be removed from the section.

Section II A. 2. of the SO Leave Usage Policy states, “No member shall feign sickness or injury, or otherwise abuse sick leave. Members on sick leave shall remain at their residence or other place for proper convalescence to facilitate an expedient return to duty.”

The sentence "Members on sick leave shall remain at their residence or other place for proper convalescence to facilitate an expedient return to duty" should be removed because employees of the Sheriff's Office are not certified medical personnel and should not be mandating that employees cannot leave their residence or another place of convalescence when ill. The phrasing of this policy leaves employees to interpret that they are unable to leave their residence or other places of convalescence to pick up prescriptions, other medications, or nourishment as needed.

Section II A. 3. and Section II B. 2. of the SO Leave Usage Policy states, "Members on sick leave may be required to furnish a physician's statement as verification of their treatment(s) rendered, examination(s) performed, and final disposition, at the discretion of the member's supervisor."

Requiring employees to produce personal medical data is a direct violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)'s Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule establishes national standards to protect an individual's health information. An individual has protected health information (PHI) or "individually identifiable health information" includes the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition and the provision of health care provided to an individual. While the Sheriff's Office may require a physician's note for an absence when an employee uses sick leave, the note should not include specific health details related to an illness or injury, including any examinations or diagnosis performed or scheduled in the future. Common elements included on a doctor excuse note are the physician's name, the name and address of the medical facility, the date of visit, patient's name, the date the patient is clear to return to work, and the physician's signature.

Leadership

Lack of trust in the leadership exists across all divisions of the Sheriff's Office, as approximately 43% of employees cited challenges with supervisors as a major concern. Specific challenges stated were:

- ◆ Favoritism by supervisors and command staff when assigning positions in the jail or appointment to positions in the Field or Administration Divisions
- ◆ Actions of the supervisors and command staff that favor the inmates rather than supporting employees
- ◆ Lack of training officers and instructional training opportunities for all staff members
- ◆ Intimidation tactics used by supervisors
- ◆ Failure by supervisors to provide relief to unit deputies for breaks or lunch
- ◆ Fear of retaliation by supervisors or command staff if employees say anything that is in opposition to the beliefs of those individuals

According to survey responses and employee interviews, the supervisory staff at the jail (Jail Commander, Assistant Jail Commander, Inmate Support Commander, Lieutenants, and Sergeants) do not exhibit leadership effectively in their respective roles nor do they adequately and equitably support employees who are assigned to work in the inmate housing units. Outside of the intake and release areas of the jail, deputies and detention officers stated they rarely saw a supervisor during their 12.25-hour shift. Over time, the lack of support and leadership oversight has hurt employee morale. For example, staff equally commented that they are not afforded any break (meal or bathroom) during their shift. Some elaborated and explained how mentally challenging it is to work in the housing unit alone with as many as 62 inmates by themselves. Even more staff expressed concern to the audit team surrounding backup, citing inconsistent response times from direct supervisors and members of the command staff. The most surprising yet routine comment from survey respondents and audit interviews was that some supervisors sequester themselves in their office to work on advanced degrees.

“There are a bunch of these here and there things, they will never be fixed unless we have a command staff member enact the change, which means working with us, earning trust, and actively, working to improve conditions at the jail.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

The audit team probed employees to understand better where leadership weaknesses exist in the Sheriff's Office, either with direct supervisors (Lieutenant and Sergeants) or members of the command staff. Leadership at the jail contributes to low morale and lack of trust by employees.

Employees across all ranks shared various comments about the supervisory staff in the Jail Division. Specifically, the command staff. Most notable were the comments describing the leadership style of the top three positions in the jail. For example, the majority of employees stated in their own words that the Jail Commander exhibited behavior that supported their observations of him engaging with inmates more often than he did with staff and that he would be more suited and qualified running a rehabilitation facility instead of the jail. The second most significant comment from staff about the Jail Commander's leadership style was that the Jail Commander rarely had meaningful or supporting interactions with staff. The majority of staff interviewed stated the Assistant Jail Commander's many years of hands-on experience had sufficiently qualified them to carry out the duties of the job, and the leadership style of the Inmate Support Commander was described as taking the easy way out of making decisions.

A communication gap exists between subordinates and supervisors that increases the risk of undue disciplinary actions against employees because they are not receiving consistent direction from their supervisors. Deputies feel that confidentiality does not exist between them and command staff, who have not been fair when issuing disciplinary actions. Safety also becomes a concern because deputies may feel reluctant to enforce policies they feel will not be supported by the leadership. These challenges have created a lack of trust in the leadership within the Sheriff's Office.

There are several factors possibly contributing to low morale amongst employees at the jail. The term “possibly” is used because there is an ongoing debate whether or not the supervisory staff is providing effective leadership at the jail. The debate is between the supervisors (comprised of the Jail Commander, Assistant Jail Commander, Inmate Support Commander, Lieutenants, and Sergeants) and the rest of the staff at the jail.

There is a dichotomy between leadership and deputies. Sergeants want to avoid undercutting deputies' authority with the inmates by checking in too often. Deputies feel that Sergeants are “hanging them out to dry” by not adequately responding to requests. Sergeants expressed their perspective to the audit team, but they are not communicating this to their deputies. When confronted with specific incidents cited by deputies, leadership complained of lack of support from the Inmate Support Commander, Assistant Jail Commander, and the Jail Commander.

“He [The Jail Commander] doesn't speak often in passing to employees. He does not acknowledge the positive in his employees. He has a deep lack of knowledge in operating a jail facility the size of Clarke County's.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

Strong leadership and effective management of jail operations are both key factors in the success of running a jail. Survey results indicate that the Jail Commander has struggled with gaining the confidence of employees. A major obstacle of the Jail Commander is his lack of law enforcement experience. Also, his lack of concern for legal policies puts inmates, visitors, and deputies at risk. The following example displays his lack of concern for policy and procedures, which the Inmate Support Commander obeys rather than following written directives.

“How are we supposed to follow rules he [The Jail Commander] puts into place when he does not follow the rules? He has never worked a unit in the jail before.”

~ Anonymous Survey Respondent

The audit team directly observed a group of visitors enter the jail without undergoing bag searches. The audit team learned later that this group was not required to undergo background checks, which is a violation of policy 9051.01 B1. This event was brought to the

attention of the Jail Commander; his justification was that the group was made up of college students, and they were harmless. The Jail Commander had also given these visitors the right to travel unsupervised within the jail, in violation of policy 9051.03. Incidents such as this explain survey responses like the following: “How are we supposed to follow the rules he put into place if he does not follow the rules?” and “They don't follow their own policies.”

Employees described the former Jail as behaving condescendingly toward staff. As a result, employee morale was affected, and subsequently, jail operations were impacted negatively. Question 21 of the employee engagement survey asked, “Do you believe the highest-ranking officer/deputy in your division (Sheriff, Chief Deputy, Jail Commander, etc.) manages the division professionally?” Forty-four percent of 135 respondents replied, “No.” Frequent comments from respondents stated the former Jail Commander lacks professionalism, has limited experience supervising deputies in the jail, and possesses unethical and immoral behavior, both personally and professionally. All characteristics described, combined has had a negative influence on employee morale and retention levels. When asked for further explanation during interviews, staff indicated the former Jail Commander was quick to discipline employees who were found to be guilty of violating moral and ethical policies, amongst others. Interestingly, the former Jail Commander expected staff to ignore his inappropriate behavior that did not align with the comprehensive policies and guidelines communicated in the over 300 pages of the SOPs manual. In a follow-up interview with the previous Jail Commander, he verified his involvement in an on-again-off-again relationship with a woman who had a criminal history, which was a direct violation of the employee code of conduct. This woman had been arrested in Athens-Clarke County as well as neighboring counties throughout the years. The former Chief Jailer downplayed the significance of the criminal component, stating, in his opinion, the arrests occurred a long time ago.

“There needs to be changes in the way this predominantly direct supervision facility is run. Safety of the staff and safety of the inmates need to be our top priority. We have violence against staff; we have had riots (unit 5 most recently) and there is very little done. There is no secure response. There is no training as a team to handle any of these problems. The command staff seems happy to keep going on day by day thinking nothing negative will ever happen. It can't always be the floor deputy's fault. There needs to be change from these three Commanders.”

~Anonymous Survey Respondent

According to the CCSO Code of Ethics Training Bulletin, issued on January 1, 2013 (see Appendix K), all members of the Clarke County Sheriff's Office are responsible for holding themselves to a high standard in both their private and professional lives. The code also states, “Members will act and behave, privately and officially, in such a manner as to project a professional image upon themselves or the Sheriff's Office.” Some acts, covered under the code, abide by all laws and orders, be respectful, be willing to act, keep official information confidential, keep political activity separate from professional activity, and do not associate with criminals.

The majority of survey respondents have a positive opinion of the Sheriff. However, one survey respondent commented,

“

“To me a Sheriff should receive the vote of his/her employees. I have never voted for my Sheriff, not because I do not like him, I believe he is a good man, a great politician, but he is not a good Sheriff. He calls himself a working Sheriff, but I have never seen him pull a shift at the jail...I have never seen him pull a station at the courthouse when they need help, I have never seen him get in his car to help with warrants nor civil papers....So where is he a working Sheriff?”

”

Further, employees stated in both the interviews and in the employee survey that he does not spend time with staff and is unfamiliar with most deputies. The Sheriff's interactions with employees have been observed to be generic and impersonal.

Employees noted in survey responses that the Sheriff rarely greets deputies by name or interacts beyond a superficial greeting. The lack of interaction with staff is another factor of the low morale and contributing to new employees in their decisions to leave the CCSO. The employees feel isolated, and some feel that the Sheriff does not know or care about them. One anonymous respondent stated they "have seen the Sheriff maybe five times in 10 years [of working] at the jail."

The Sheriff is unaware or uninformed of the issues in the Jail Division. However, many survey respondents suggest that the Jail Commander, responsible for day-to-day jail operations, has neglected to bring problems to the attention of the Sheriff. Many employees, from deputies to captains, believe that the Sheriff would be far more involved if the Jail Commander better informed him of problems at the jail.

It is more costly and time consuming to recruit new staff than it is to retain current staff. The leadership team either do not know or are unconcerned with the reasons former staff voluntarily left the Sheriff's Office. Understanding the factors that contribute to low employee retention or high turnover should be the top priority for every member on the leadership team, which is comprised of the Sheriff, Chief Deputy, Jail Commander, Captains, Lieutenants, and Sergeants.

Before the SO can improve employee retention, leadership must learn the specific reasons why employees voluntarily leave the agency. This information can be obtained by administering an anonymous survey to employees annually or until the retention problem no longer exists. The objective of the survey should be to identify what is important to employees and what conditions exist that encourage deputies to look for other opportunities outside the agency. Essentially, the leadership at the Sheriff's Office need to understand why some employees choose to stay and why some choose to leave. By surveying employees, the SO can identify factors that are appealing to staff. Conversely, surveying employees will also shed light on the factors that result in employees voluntarily leaving the SO.

Due to the level of distrust and fear of retaliation employees indicated in the employee survey and during in-person interviews, the audit team suggests the SO hire an external company to conduct the agency-wide survey. The deliverables an external company should be responsible for completing and providing to the agency are:

- ◆ Working with the SO to develop a survey tool
- ◆ Oversee the deployment of the survey to employees
- ◆ Collect survey results and analyze data
- ◆ Prepare a summary report for the Sheriff's Office highlighting results from the survey

The overarching benefit of the employee engagement survey for the SO is identifying issues or concerns of staff (real or perceived) that cause them to contemplate leaving the agency. Improving retention would conversely alleviate several factors since the staffing shortage is expected to decrease overtime. Benefits for the employee are improved morale, less overtime, and greater opportunities for onsite training, to name a few.

MORALE AND LEADERSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 24:** Employees should be allowed to uphold the policies and procedures of the jail without fear of disciplinary actions being taken against them.
- Recommendation 25:** Training, safety, overtime, sick leave abuse policy, favoritism, leadership, and inconsistencies in enforcement of disciplinary actions need to be addressed and improved to raise morale.
- Recommendation 26:** Jail leadership should demonstrate a common understanding of disciplinary policies and enforce disciplinary actions equally among violators.
- Recommendation 27:** Abolishment of the currently implemented Sick Leave Abuse Policy and replace with a revised Leave Usage Policy.
- Recommendation 28:** Abolishment of the currently implemented Sick Leave Abuse Policy and replace with a revised Leave Usage Policy.
- Recommendation 29:** Sections II A. 1, 2, 3, and Section II B. 2 need to be revised.
- Recommendation 30:** All supervisory and management staff within the Sheriff's Office need to build a rapport of trust with all employees.
- Recommendation 31:** The Sheriff's Office must reevaluate and in some cases, replace current Jail Division leadership to restore employee confidence and morale. [This recommendation was implemented during the audit.](#)
- Recommendation 32:** The current Jail Commander should be replaced with an individual who upholds the code of conduct of the Sheriff's Office. [This recommendation was implemented during the audit.](#)
- Recommendation 33:** The Sheriff needs to make a more concerted effort to address and acknowledge all of his employees. The Sheriff should make every effort to visit the jail regularly (at least bi-monthly) to encourage informal contact with staff and inmates and to informally observe living and working conditions at the jail.
- Recommendation 34:** The SO should hire a consultant to administer an employee survey annually to understand the level of job satisfaction amongst employees.

E. Warrant Services

This audit included an examination of the Sheriff Offices' Field Services Section servicing of warrants for the Judiciary, as there had been reports of a substantial number. Throughout the past five fiscal years, the Sheriff's Office has experienced an increase in active warrants. As shown in the 1998 audit, some warrants have remained active because they do not have a statute of limitations. Approximately 47% of 127 respondents noted that there is a need for additional training in processing warrants and civil papers. Approximately 82% of respondents from the Field Services Section claimed that warrants that do not have a statute of limitations remain active in the Sheriff's Office. A majority of employees in the Field Services Section expressed that inadequate staffing was the reason for the increase in warrants.

When this audit began in January 2018, the CCSO stated that they receive approximately 8,000 warrants to process each fiscal year. However, during the Auditor's meeting with the Sheriff, the Sheriff confirmed a backlog of approximately 9,500 unserved warrants and civil papers just three months into the fiscal year. However, the agency could not explain the significant increase over the prior year.

Within the Field Services Section, there are 12 full-time Deputies and Senior Deputies assigned to serve warrants and process civil actions. During the audit, there were two vacancies.

Redirecting staff from the Field Services Section created the unintended consequence of a shortage of deputies primarily responsible for serving warrants, and processing civil papers and court orders. The number of warrants issued has not increased exponentially; however, the lack of staffing has affected the ability to serve the warrants and therefore, there is a backlog of warrants that need to serving with additional warrants added steadily. Staff assigned to serve warrants are often pulled off of those duties to assist with other details such as inmate and juvenile transports and covering courtroom security. They are also required to work at least one-weekend overtime shift per month at the jail.

Additionally, the success of five accountability courts: DUI/Drug Court, Family Dependency Treatment Court,



Felony Drug Court, Veteran's Court, and Treatment and Accountability Court, have stretched manpower in the Field Services Section. Adding to the challenge is the increase in the number of judges over the years and the staffing-shortage in the Field Division. Overall, the staffing shortage has resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars spent to cover overtime costs.

F. Inmate Medical Care

In accordance with Sections 7.45 and 7.46 of the United States General Accounting Office Government Auditing Standards, certain issues identified during an audit may be brought to the attention of the Department/Agency being audited, even though the area of concern was not included in the original scope.

During the audit, the audit team learned of an additional topic requiring further review. A revised scope of the audit was approved on August 7, 2018, to include inmate medical services.

The audit team will evaluate the quality of care provided to inmates by Armor Correctional Health Services Inc. and assess whether they comply with the agreed upon contract with the SO. The findings will be reported in a separate addendum to the audit report.

G. Comparison of Prior Audits of the Sheriff's Office

We reviewed two previous audits of the Sheriff's Office conducted by the Office of Operational Analysis (formerly the Auditor's Office) to determine if recommendations made in the prior reports (1998 and 2005) were implemented.

The following audit report was a *Review of the Operations and Organization of the Sheriff's Office*, conducted in 1997 with a report finalized in August 1998. The following table summarizes the general findings and recommendations contained in the report narrative. To facilitate follow up on the implementation of the recommendations, the status of these recommendations was verified with the SO during this audit.

Operations and Organization of the Sheriff's Office
Submitted by the Office of Operational Analysis (formerly the Auditor's Office) 1998
AUDIT OBJECTIVE: The review focused on the Field Operations and Jail Divisions with emphasis on:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Organization and staffing• Courtroom security and prisoner transportation• Automation uses• Use of overtime• Administrative functions performed by sworn personnel• Backlog in serving warrants

Operations and Organization of the Sheriff's Office			
Key Findings	Recommendation	Status	Comments
Currently, one sergeant supervises the Courts Unit, the Courthouse Security Unit, and Warrant Desk, staff.	Reassign a sergeant to provide supervision for the Courts Unit.	N	Demands on current organizational structure and the need to fill current openings do not make this option viable.
Savings in the reduction of overtime expense can be used to offset the cost of adding positions.	Increase staff assigned to provide court security by two deputies and one secretary.	N	Unable to get fully staffed, thereby, not feasible to add positions. Also, we use all overtime funds allotted, so I do not know that savings of overtime should be considered.
Deputies are working between two and four hours of overtime on Monday through Thursday and are not able to use flex time on Friday.	Assign at least two deputies to work ten-hour shifts Monday through Thursday and have Friday as a scheduled day off. Increasing the number of deputies assigned to courts would provide enough coverage on Friday so that two deputies could be assigned to ten-hour shifts Monday through Thursday.	Y and N	We time adjust overtime as much as possible on slower activity days, which could be considered a form of flextime. We do not have the number of filled positions available to flex time as recommended given the volume of court activity of Fridays.
Currently, each court has a set schedule for arraignment days, jail call, and preliminary felony hearings. Any reduction would decrease the number of deputies required in the courtroom to transport and guard inmates.	Work with the courts to develop options to schedule court sessions that avoid the transportation of large numbers of prisoners on a single day.	Y	We have asked the courts to schedule court appearances that lessen the volume of inmates that need to be transported on any given day, and the courts have worked with us. New jail to court video system currently being installed that will hopefully be utilized by the court system that may reduce the volume of inmates that need to be physically brought to the courthouse for court hearings. It remains to be seen to what extent the Judges will utilize it.
Changing the schedule to midnight to 8 pm would provide four hours per day that could be assigned to other functions, such as providing relief for court security.	Reevaluate the need for a deputy to work from 8 pm to midnight after the back door of the courthouse is closed for the night.	Unknown	Unable to answer. Unfamiliar with a back door that needs a deputy.

Operations and Organization of the Sheriff's Office			
Key Findings	Recommendation	Status	Comments
Increase the number of deputy positions serving warrants.	Increase staffing by an additional secretary to enter warrants into GCIC and perform warrant validation, allowing the corporal currently performing this function to be reassigned.	Y and N	Entering warrants and warrant validations are functions of civilian staff. However, no additional positions were ever added.
Increase the number of hours available to serve warrants by reducing the number of squads from four to two resulting in a decrease of daily coverage from 16 to 12 hours allows sergeants to be more effectively used as supervisors were needed in the Field Division.	Modify the hours and composition of warrant squads to reduce the number of supervisors and to increase the number of deputies per shift. Reduce warrant squads from four sergeants and eight deputies to two sergeants and 10 deputies to increase the number of warrants served.	Y and N	Effective warrant service and inmate transportation demands require a consistent range of 16 hours vs. 12 hours. Early morning and late evenings are good warrant service times to find key individuals. I believe the current structure of position assignments for the Field Section stems from a Georgia Sheriff's Association manpower study completed in the late 1990s.
One sergeant is responsible for supervising courts, courthouse security, and the warrant desk. Conversely, sergeants in the Warrants Unit supervise only two employees each.	Reorganize the Field Division to provide additional supervision in courts, courthouse security, and serving of civil papers.	N	Needed, but see comments on the first line item.
Time summaries for courthouse security officers should include the number of hours worked at each door.	Revise the daily Watch Commander Report to reflect additional functions performed by the Sheriff's Office.	Unknown	Recent GSA study suggests three deputies at each door. We rarely have the manpower to achieve this objective. Not sure capturing this on a Watch Commander report is required when we are already not meeting recommended practices.

The second audit was a *Review of Overtime Usage within the Sheriff Office* with a report issued in May 2005. The report did not specifically identify finding but did include a number of recommendations. The following table summarizes the general findings and recommendations contained in the report narrative. To facilitate follow-up on the implementation of the recommendations included the status of these recommendations should be verified with the Sheriff's Office.

Sheriff Overtime Usage Report			
Submitted by the Office of Operational Analysis (formerly the Auditor's Office) 2005			
AUDIT OBJECTIVES: Review overtime use within the Sheriff's Office			
Key Findings	Recommendation	Status	Comments
The Sheriff's Office is allowed to hire five additional deputies over the authorized number of positions. These positions are known as transitional positions and are used to maintain full staffing given the level of employee attrition paired with the training period required for new deputies.	Consideration should be given to temporarily increase the number of transitional positions until the current vacancies have been filled, and the new employees have completed the in-house training program.	Unknown	We are not close to being fully staffed.
The Jail Division needs to add four additional deputy positions.	Increase the number of deputy positions to cover the security posts at the jail.	Y and N	Positions asked for each year in the early 2000s, but never funded in the old jail. New positions were added when we moved into the new jail.
Offer a promotional incentive to staff.	Develop a career ladder for deputies with a promotional plan.	Y	The sheriff has outlined requirements for Senior Deputy, Sergeant, and Lieutenant.
The demand for sheriff deputies seriously exceeds the current supply of qualified deputy candidates.	The Sheriff's Office should increase recruitment efforts to identify more candidates that are qualified.	Y	We attend job fairs, met with community stakeholders, developed recruitment video, and have held career expo's as recruiting strategy.

H. Conclusion

The information gathered during this audit provided a sufficient picture of the manpower demands on the SO to establish that there is a severe shortage of sworn deputies. Staffing demands made regularly upon jail staff, courts, and the warrants and civil process staff stretches resources too thin to the detriment of employee retention. The employee survey reveals that the majority of responding employees feel unsupported and unappreciated by management. The audit team sees these issues as harmful to the agency's workforce. There is more incentive for current staff to seek alternative employment options or to retire as soon as they are eligible if they are unhappy in their employment.

The SO must increase retention rates while expanding recruitment efforts. If the SO does not address the retention rates and low morale, the problem will continue to worsen. It is more costly and time consuming to recruit than to retain staff. However, before this can be done successfully, the SO should deploy an anonymous employee survey to determine why their staff are leaving and how to solve the problem.

The SO has a high number of vacancies, particularly in the Jail Division. These vacancies are driven by employee separations, largely as a result of employees seeking opportunities outside of the SO. To improve its recruitment and retention efforts overall, and address its high vacancy and voluntary separation rates, the SO should implement, or improve upon, as many of the recommended practices described herein.

The observations, conclusions, and recommendations included in this report are the product of both a qualitative and quantitative examination of the data accumulated during the audit. This includes analysis of the employee survey, audit interviews, field observations, requested documents, and follow-up interviews during the audit.

III. Response from the Sheriff's Office

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
STAFFING: Recruitment and Retention			
1. The Sheriff's Office is understaffed due to low retention and recruitment levels.	Improve recruitment and retention efforts to reach total authorized levels. Coordinate with HR to finalize the reserve deputy program. Implement as an initiative for the next budget cycle.	Reserve Deputy Program is complete. It is now being advertised through NEOGOV and HR's weekly job postings.	Completed
2. Recruitment levels are low due to lack of qualified applicants.	Enhance recruitment efforts to attract qualified applicants.	1. Attending local job fairs. 2. Created advertisement video to be shown in movie theaters and posted on social media. 3. We created billboard advertisements and placed them in strategic locations within the county. 4. We created recruiting cards for staff to disseminate to prospective applicants. 5. We've hosted open house job fairs. 6. Initiated "each one, reach one initiative" while promoting the hiring and recruitment bonus.	Ongoing
<p>2. Follow-up: Of the action items listed to be implemented, please indicate which of the recruitment initiatives are new since the audit began (March 2018).</p> <p>Please provide additional details about video advertising. For example, what is the frequency of video advertisements? At what theatres are they being shown? How many videos are advertised weekly? Are advertisements on a certain day? <i>AMC Athens Theater (Lexington Road). It is a 30 second advertisement just before the previews start. It is played before every movie in the theater, 7 days a week.</i></p> <p>Where are the billboard advertisements strategically located? How long will they be advertised? <i>The billboard advertisements ran for one month in February 2019. There were 5 locations selected, strategically selected throughout ACC.</i></p> <p>After initial advertising expires is the SO considering exploring additional advertising? <i>There has not been any consideration in the near term for future billboard advertisements. I'm sure it will be revisited as an option at a later point.</i></p> <p>Please provide clarification on the "each one, reach one initiative". <i>The Sheriff has met with all of the shifts at the Jail and emphasized to staff the point that if each deputy would recruit one person, then we would not be short staffed. He told the deputies that they are in position to be the best recruiters for the agency. Why not the courts? They are also short-staff. Recruitment should be provided by all members of the agency.</i></p> <p>Explain the recruitment bonus. How are staff incentivized for any applications received due to the dissemination of the recruiting cards? <i>There are no incentives for applications received; however, employees are eligible to earn up to \$750 if someone they recruited if was hired by the agency. But there is a hiring incentive that rewards members up to \$750 if an applicant is hired and was recruited by the member.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>2. Follow-up: Of the action items listed to be implemented, please indicate which of the recruitment initiatives are new since the audit began (March 2018).</p> <p>Please provide additional details about video advertising. For example, what is the frequency of the video advertisements? At what theatres are they being shown? How many videos are advertised on a weekly basis? Are advertisements on a certain day? <i>AMC Athens Theater (Lexington Road). It is a 30 second advertisement just before the previews start. It is played before every movie in the theater, 7 days a week.</i></p> <p>Where are the billboard advertisements strategically located? How long will they be advertised? <i>The billboard advertisements ran for one month in February 2019. There were 5 locations selected, strategically selected throughout ACC.</i></p> <p>After initial advertising expires is the SO considering exploring additional advertising? <i>There has not been any consideration in the near term for future billboard advertisements. I'm sure it will be revisited as an option at a later point.</i></p> <p>Please provide clarification on the "each one, reach one initiative". <i>The Sheriff has met with all of the shifts at the Jail and emphasized to staff the point that if each deputy would recruit one person, then we would not be short staffed. He told the deputies that they are in position to be the best recruiters for the agency. Why not the courts? They are also short-staff. Recruitment should be provided by all members of the agency.</i></p> <p>Explain the recruitment bonus. How are staff incentivized for any applications received due to the dissemination of the recruiting cards? <i>There are no incentives for applications received; however, employees are eligible to earn up to \$750 if someone they recruited if was hired by the agency. But there is a hiring incentive that rewards members up to \$750 if an applicant is hired and was recruited by the member.</i></p>			
3. Employees are not given a realistic expectation of the job function and jail environment during the recruitment process.	Offer realistic job preview during the recruitment process.	Consider offering and scheduling this option at the initial jail tour.	Consider starting in 2 months
4. An alternative schedule is needed and may positively improve attrition and retention rates.	Change the 12-hour shifts from 8-8 to possibly 6-6 or 7-7. Or implement 8 or 10-hour shifts in place of 12-hour shifts.	None. Adjusting the 12 hours shifts to a different time frame (6-6, 7-7) creates a hardship for those deputies who have school aged children. Changing the 12 hour shifts to 10 hours or 8 hours will result in more positions needed to cover posts and therefore it is not a feasible option.	None
<p>4. Follow-up: The employee survey revealed that 137 out of 139 employees responded to a question regarding an alternative work schedule. Respondent results indicate that 63% are open to an alternative work schedule (24% of employees indicated they were in favor of a shift change and 39% of employees indicated they were open to the idea). Please explain what would be the reason the Sheriff's Office would not be willing to explore this option further.</p> <p><i>The 12 hour shift is the most efficient shift schedule in terms of the number of staff needed to run the jail. An 8 hour or 10 hour shifts requires more employees to staff the mandatory posts in the Jail. In addition, effective June, the SO will be going back to rotating shifts. Rotation will be every 56 days (2 - 28 pay cycles).Based on our internal surveys we had many members who had preferences for working day time. Rotating shifts would give members day time working hours every 56 days. It would break up the monotony of working the same shift schedule. It also would help balance our shifts experience wise. And most importantly in my opinion, working day shift and night shift produces a more well-rounded deputy who is more knowledgeable of the operation of the jail.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
5. Scheduling of overtime is poorly implemented.	Improve communication between divisions and supervisors regarding overtime schedules or have one person responsible for coordinating the overtime scheduling.	Overtime is generally known a month in advance. Substituting overtime is no longer allowed. The Jail Operations Captain is the overtime coordinator.	Completed
5. Follow-up: Please explain the reason substituting overtime is no longer allowed. Are personnel across every rank subject to work overtime? <i>We felt that we were losing overtime hours by allowing certain members to substitute their overtime obligations to someone else. Mandatory overtime is for those members with the rank of detention officer, deputy, senior deputy, and sergeant. It may expand upwards to Lieutenant at a later time. Lieutenants and above cannot get paid overtime, but receive comp time. However, more discussions with HR may occur in the future to explore the option of allowing Lieutenants to get overtime pay if allowed under FLSA.</i>			
6. Overtime is inconsistently processed between the Field and Jail Divisions.	Some employees are paid overtime at the rate of time and a half and others are required to time adjust for any overtime worked. Appropriate compensation of overtime pay or comp time earned instead of time adjusting when staffing levels are already reduced will help morale.	Mandatory overtime at the Jail is paid overtime. Deputies are not required to time adjust mandatory overtime. Time adjusting is required outside of mandatory overtime or overtime in the Field Section as the CCSO must be good stewards of tax payer dollars.	None
TRAINING: New Hires			
7. No comprehensive formal training program exists for new hires at the jail.	Provide in-depth training to new hires and abide by the JTO program that was last updated in October 2017.	There has always been a formal JTO training program. However, it was not updated when the new Jail was constructed. Furthermore, the program degraded from lack of oversight. The program is a ten (10) week course of instruction, and has since been updated with new oversight. This will aid in ensuring the program is followed as intended. The trainers in the program are also receiving the professional training that is needed to maintain the integrity of the program.	6-12 months to digitize it, and train the trainers

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>7. Follow-up: Please indicate the number of staff who maintained their Jail Training Officer (JTO) certification during the audit time period (FY14-FY18). <i>We have 2 certified JTO's. Other JTO's that we certified are no longer with the agency. The plan is to host this class. The Sheriff's Association proctors the course and the earliest that they said we could host would be in the Fall of 2019.</i></p> <p>Please explain what "6-12 months to digitize" entails. <i>The JTO program existed only in paper form. It has now been transformed to an electronic format.</i></p> <p>What is the estimated time frame it will take to certify and train the trainers? <i>The class is 1 week. It is anticipated that it will take several months to get all of the JTO's through the one week training class as we will have to stagger attendance. How many employees will receive training to become a JTO?</i></p> <p>As stated in the audit report, the JTO program was last updated in October 2017; however, the program has been inactive for some time. Since the program will be re-established, please explain how the SO will "shore up" fill in training gaps and accomplish increasing training for new employees at the jail from the current method of 5 days of training to 10 weeks of training? <i>By directive. Also, the administration and oversight of the program will now be transferred to the Training Unit. The Training Unit will have more time to ensure the integrity of the program is maintained.</i></p> <p>Will the SO evaluate training needs and fill in training gaps for existing employees who received 3 - 5 days to a 10 week program who have been hired after the opening of the "new" jail? <i>No.</i></p> <p>How will the extended training for the existing employees be accomplished? <i>Mostly through annual in-service training. If a member is transferred to a more specialized position such as programs or classification, they will be trained by supervisors or by the person who will be vacating the position.</i></p> <p>Please describe any on-going professional training required of the trainers to maintain the integrity of the program. <i>There are no ongoing training requirements.</i></p>			
8. Insufficient staffing in the jail is resulting in a lack of experienced employees available to train new hires.	Training should be conducted in accordance with the JTO guidelines last updated in October 2017. Training Officers should have a minimum of 2 years of experience working as a Deputy within the CCSO before training new hires.	Shifts will be re-balanced to evenly distribute personnel experience. This will result in each shift having adequate and experienced trainers.	3 months
<p>8. Follow-up: <i>The SO action plan states, "shifts at the jail will be re-balanced to evenly distribute personnel experience." Please identify the steps being taken to achieve this goal. Effective June 2019, we are going to rotating shifts every 56 days. Shift rotation will be from days to nights and nights to days. Rebalancing involved about 30 deputies being reassigned to another shift. Rebalancing involved implementing proper ratios of rank, gender, and uniformity with quantity for each of the 4 shifts.</i></p> <p>Please describe what this will look like after all changes have been made. <i>See above.</i></p> <p>Who determines the distribution of personnel (staff volunteers for a different shift or Command Staff makes changes without staff input)? <i>Command Staff makes changes without staff input.</i></p>			
9. There is an over-reliance on online training classes offered through Power DMS.	Increase in-person training sessions and utilize qualified staff members to provide professional development courses.	Online classes are important for efficiency and financial reasons. Recognizing the need for more individualized instruction, plans are underway to host more live on-site training that pertain specifically to operations of the Sheriff's Office.	3-6 months

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>9. Follow-up:</p> <p>As stated in the audit report, many employees expressed a strong desire to participate in instructor-led courses versus computer based training. The audit team has verified that there are several instructor-led training options available throughout ACCUG. For example, CPR/AED courses are offered by the Fire Department, Police Department, the Safety and Risk Division of Human Resources, and the Leisure Services Department. In addition, the Police Department offers training in Crisis Intervention, Fair and Impartial Policing, Surviving Active Shooter, and Verbal De-escalation, and the UGA Police Department teaches Interpersonal Communications and Cultural Diversity at the Athens-Clarke County Police Department. All of these courses are relevant and open to employees of the Sheriff's Office. These classes are convenient, affordable, and offer the least disruption to agency operations. The convenience of these public safety related courses are similar to the supervisory training courses offered by the Organizational Development Department, which many SO staff verified they attended.</p> <p>Please provide the reason why the SO does not take advantage of these training opportunities for all of its employees which are available from other departments/agencies.</p> <p><i>The only reasons why we would not approve for a member to attend these classes would be for short staffing reasons or if they request training that is not applicable to their job functions. Members are required to get their training and leave requests within sufficient time to determine if they are approved to be off for leave or off for training purposes. I think the broader question is are the members submitting written training requests which is our policy because it is rare that we would deny such training unless it is a short staffed issue or not applicable training. The sentiment is that deputies want more live training at the Sheriff's Office which in the last few weeks we have offered live training in Mental health first aid training, Crisis Intervention, defensive tactics and cell extraction training. In the coming months we will be offering the (live) JTO training, the FBI-LEEDA Supervisor Leadership Institute (SLI) training, in addition to the ongoing firearms and taser training.</i></p>			
<p>10. On-site training (such as classes offered thru GPSTC, GSA, jailer school, etc.) is not offered to all Sheriff's Office employees on a consistent basis.</p>	<p>Provide and support training and career development opportunities for all employees.</p>	<p>Opportunities for training in the Sheriff's Office is not based on favoritism, but on staffing and scheduling, position assignment and requirements, tenure, prerequisites for the training itself, and the member's demonstrated commitment to the Sheriff's Office.</p>	<p>On-going</p>
<p>10. Follow-up:</p> <p>As stated in the audit report, survey results indicated 57% of respondents answered affirmatively that the supervisory teams (up to and including the Sheriff) show favoritism towards certain employees. What the employees hear, see, think and experience is the basis of their perception and their reality.</p> <p>As it relates to training opportunities, please describe the criteria that is evaluated to determine if an employee is successfully demonstrating commitment to the Sheriff's Office. How is this measured? Are employees aware of the specific indicators they are evaluated against?</p> <p><i>Performance evaluations, initiative, is the member stuck on complaining and grumbling or are they involved with being part of the solution or offering solutions. Does the member accept constructive criticism on how to perform a task or do they exhibit disdain for supervisors or don't perform as required because of demonstrated laziness.</i></p> <p>When staffing levels are low, training limitations are understandable. However, training prerequisites are normally offset by support of the supervisory staff allowing employees to gain those prerequisites. Further, position assignments are controlled by the supervisory staff not the employee. As such, it is highly probable that staff believes a culture of favoritism exists. How/what changes could the SO make to mitigate the perceptions of employee favoritism?</p> <p><i>Position assignments will always be supervisory controlled. Members are encouraged to put in requests or applications for reassignment but the decision rests with the supervisors. Mitigating perceptions of favoritism involves communication. In recent meetings with the shifts, communication between all levels of rank was emphasized. There are also built in mechanisms such as performance evaluations that allows this communication to take place. If members are not satisfied with the response they receive from their immediate supervisors, then they can take it to the next level, but they can't use retaliation as an excuse because we do not retaliate against anyone.</i></p> <p>It is understood that supervisors attend regular training and conferences. What is the value/benefit of this supervisor training and what is the procedure used for selecting those who can attend? <i>The process of requesting to attend any training for anyone in the Sheriff's Office starts with a written training request. It is generally the annual Georgia Jail Association Conference that supervisors are permitted to attend. Attendance level from our supervisory staff has varied in the past. Approval or Disapproval of training is on a case by case basis depending on the need for the training, location of training, staffing levels, and cost.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
TRAINING: Job Related			
11. Supervisors have shown a lack of supervisory and communication skills.	Provide training to supervisory and management staff on communication skills - both verbal and written, and supervisory skills.	1. Newly promoted supervisors will be prioritized to attend supervision level training if they have not already received it. 2. Various leadership classes will be identified and offered to mid-level and upper level supervisors.	On-going
12. Job related leadership training is not provided to staff.	Existing supervisory personnel need to train their employees to become supervisors by allowing them to observe and perform leadership duties.	Current staffing levels presents challenges in meeting this task. In the past, roll call trainings do present opportunities for members to receive direct training from their supervisors. This method of training will be re-instituted with an emphasis on leadership development.	On-going
12. Follow-up: Please define roll call training. It is expected that a Sergeant would assist Senior Deputies vying for promotional opportunities. For example, job shadowing and performing some of the Sergeant's tasks would prepare them for the duties of a higher position. The same is true for Sergeants vying for Lieutenant positions, and Lieutenants vying for Captain positions. How clarify how staffing levels present a challenge for supervisors in giving their subordinates guidance to help them prepare for promotional opportunities? <i>We generally do not overstaff for job shadowing purposes. There is nothing that would prevent a member of job shadowing on their own time if they have a drive to get promoted. Rotating among assignments in the jail is another way to prepare for supervisory training. Much of this is dependent upon how motivated the member is and to what level of initiative they exercise.</i>			
13. Staff members who are certified instructors are not utilized to conduct in-house training at the SO.	Utilize more job specific sources in training, including JTO instructor, defensive tactics, Taser, CPR, firearms, and general instruction.	The Sheriff's Office is utilizing its instructors for defensive tactics, Taser, CPR, and firearms instruction. The JTO instructor will be utilized in the near future to conduct a JTO class. There are, however, a number of instructors who have a general instructor certificate that are underutilized that could be used for other non-specialized instruction. Utilizing these other instructors will be further explored for new employee orientation and Basic Jail Security training.	On-going
TRAINING: Discrepancies Between Divisions			
14. The length of training offered is significantly different between the Jail Division and the Field Division.	Increase Jail Division training to more closely reflect Field Division training both in length of time and in-depth coverage.	The full JTO program is to be implemented which is 10 weeks in length. The FTO program is 12 weeks in length.	Completed

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>14. Follow-up: The SO's response in Finding #7 states, "it will take 6-12 months to digitize the JTO Program and train the trainers." Please clarify how this recommendation is already complete considering the 6-12 months of required steps. Please explain the implementation time frame to Finding #14 as being completed. <i>The digitizing process was a two step process. First the training existed in paper form, now it has been transferred into an electronic format. Second, the electronic format will need to be uploaded into the ADORE records management system. This second part is still pending. The 6-12 month reference of the JTO program is training our JTOs to be trainers. This will need to be staggered over several months as we cannot let all of our members that will be JTOs to take leave to get the training. Our staffing level does not allow for this.</i></p> <p>Explain the steps of the digitization process and the time necessary for each step. <i>Explained above.</i></p> <p>How many deputies will initially complete the training required for the JTO program; how many per shift? <i>That has not been determined yet, but it would be good to have at least 2 or more JTOs per shift.</i></p>			
<p>15. Training is inconsistent throughout each shift in the jail.</p>	<p>Supervisors' interpretations of policies and procedures must be made uniform across divisions so that transferring employees will have clear, non- contradictory instruction on how to perform their duties.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Update JTO program so that procedures are uniform and the curriculum is consistently taught by all JTO's 2. Jail post orders are currently being reviewed by supervisors and updated as necessary. This will aid in bringing consistency to jail operations. 3. Roll call training as mentioned previously will require supervisors to re-familiarize themselves with written policy and post orders. 	<p>6 months</p>
<p>15. Follow-up: How will this action plan be implemented to ensure that existing/seasoned staff will be trained under the same model as new hires? <i>Already responded to this question in part. As far as uniform enforcement of policy, there is some slight adjustments within policy in part that allows for some deputy discretion; however, the main components must be carried out in a non-contradictory manner. It is incumbent upon seasoned staff and supervisors to familiarize themselves with policy so that they themselves know what to do and to give instruction. The SO has bimonthly watch commander meetings whereby we discuss many policy issues and clear up inconsistencies.</i></p>			
<p>SAFETY and SECURITY</p>			
<p>16. Inmate disciplinary actions are applied inconsistently.</p>	<p>Disciplinary actions need to be explicitly communicated in SOPs and understood by all supervisory and subordinate staff and then applied consistently.</p>	<p>Disciplinary time is specified in policy and it is based on the inmate's facility behavior. Inmate disciplinary time cannot be modified unless it goes through the appeal process with the Jail Commander having the final decision for sustaining the original disciplinary time or approving any reduction of time. Acts of violence are considered a major violation and are addressed with the stiffest penalties. In some cases, in addition to the administrative disciplinary time, inmates are criminally charged for certain acts of behavior inside the Jail. With regards to comments that inmates "run the jail", CCSO team members are encouraged through the Direct Supervision model to enforce unit housing rules and regulations, and supervisors are instructed to support any reasonable deputy responses to rule infractions. No inmate or groups of inmates are allowed to "run the jail".</p>	<p>N/A</p>

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>16. Follow-up: As stated in the audit report, staff interviews and survey responses definitively identified the former Jail Commander as the primary staff member in violation of established policies and procedures at the SO regarding reducing inmate disciplinary time or the dismissal of inmate disciplinary actions altogether.</p> <p>How many inmate disciplinary appeals were conducted by the Jail Commander during the audit time frame of FY14-FY18? No response?</p> <p>During the audit time frame (FY14-FY18) how many cases were documented of inmates being criminally charged for misbehavior inside the jail? No response?</p>			
<p>17. New hires do not receive adequate training to develop the confidence necessary to work the housing units alone in the jail.</p>	<p>Training should be longer than three days and new hires should have a clear understanding of their authority before they are exposed to large groups of inmates.</p>	<p>Previously addressed in number's 7 and 14.</p>	<p>6-12 months</p>
<p>7. Follow-up: Provide the details of the JTO training that will take place for those hired since January 2019 while the enhanced digitization of the program is being finalized.</p> <p><i>Individuals hired since 2019 will receive 80 hours of classroom training related to the policy, procedures, and responsibilities of a detention officer / deputy sheriff prior to assignment on shift. The course provides an introduction to the JTO program. A JTO manual is discussed and given to each new hire outlining how to fully meet and pass the criteria while in training. The trainee will be graded on their performance based on the measures listed and provided in the manual for the new hire to reference while in training. The trainee will also complete Security and Awareness training and Terminal Operator Certification prior to going to shift.</i></p> <p><i>The JTO course/ New Deputy/Detention Officer Orientation will also cover:</i></p> <p><i>Direct supervision training</i> <i>Jail training Officer</i> <i>Mental Health First Aid Class</i> <i>CPR and First Aid</i> <i>Taser training</i> <i>Pepper Spray training</i> <i>Defensive Tactics</i> <i>Handcuffing and restraint chair</i> <i>Practical's (cell searching, observing headcount rollcall, feeding, etc.)</i></p> <p><i>The JTO class for new deputies/detention officers provides an overall insight of the role and responsibilities expected of officers prior to assigning the individual to shift. The new hire will have some foundation and understanding to work and grow from once they are given permanent assignment and what they are expected to do thereafter.</i></p> <p><i>2 week orientation then transition into the JTO program.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
18. Reopening the old jail for alternative or additional housing units creates safety, staffing, and security challenges.	Additional housing units should not be opened until staffing reaches optimal levels.	Inmate population, staffing levels, and safety and security are primary factors for determining the opening and closing of housing units. The Sheriff's Office competently assesses those factors in determining which housing units are opened and closed. This is an ongoing assessment with safety and security for all at the forefront of these assessments.	N/A
<p>18. Follow-up: Who is responsible for assessing the factors which determine the housing units that are opened and closed? How often are these assessments considered? <i>Informally it is ongoing, collective assessment by the two captains and Chief Jailer assigned to the Jail. It is primarily driven by staffing level, inmate population or needed facility maintenance. It always comes up the chain of command as a recommendation, then the final decision is made by the Sheriff.</i></p> <p>Due to the staffing shortages, spreading out the housing units creates difficulty for staff to respond with assistance; especially at those times when there is no victor on shift. What circumstances would necessitate the opening of the additional units within the older sections of the jail? <i>Regarding those units, the primary reason would be staffing levels. There are some inmate classification ramifications that would enhance the classification of inmates if the older units were opened, but due to current staffing levels, it is not feasible to open those units.</i></p>			
19. Deputies working excessive overtime hours have a higher propensity to experience fatigue and burnout during their shifts.	Recruitment and retention levels must be improved to reduce the number of overtime hours needed to provide adequate coverage of all security posts. If needed, overtime should be spread to all available personnel to limit the amount of excessive overtime any staff member has to experience.	1. Overtime is spread evenly among deputies at the Sheriff's Office. 2. Recently, six members from the Field Section were transferred back to the Jail Section to supplement Jail staffing and to reduce overtime. 3. Recruiting efforts are ongoing. Members are attending recruiting fairs, members are being asked to recruit at least one person – "Each one, Reach one" initiative. Recruiting efforts have extended to billboard advertisements and movie theater promotional videos. 4. The Sheriff's Office has taken over the initial applicant background investigation process from HR in an attempt to speed up the hiring process.	On-going

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>19. Follow-up: Have additional staff been assigned to recruitment efforts? <i>No.</i></p> <p>When was the billboard and movie theater advertising implemented? <i>Billboard - February 2019; Movie Theater advertisement - On or about March 2019 and ongoing for one year.</i></p> <p>What are the strategic locations of the billboards? <i>I think I have already answered this question, but they were strategically placed in different areas of the Athens-Clarke County.</i></p> <p>Are there any other new recruitment initiatives in addition to billboard advertisements and movie theater promotional videos? <i>The Sheriff has challenged members with the "each one, reach one" initiative. Recruiting cards about the size of business cards were printed and handed out to members for each one to be a recruiter.</i></p> <p>Is there a financial incentive to employees who participate in the "each one, reach one" initiative? If so, what is the financial incentive and is it a one-time incentive or accumulative over a designated period of time? <i>Not specifically to this initiative, but they would be eligible to receive the recruiting bonus that HR has oversight of.</i></p> <p>Have recruitment results been realized (seen) by the SO due to the billboard and movie theater advertising? Please share those results if they have been realized. <i>Mechanisms were put in place in NEOGOV to measure these results as of the week of about May 6. Right now there is no measurement data.</i></p> <p>Please explain how taking over the initial background investigations from HR will "speed up" the hiring process. <i>As we have taken over the initial background investigations from HR, we have the ability to immediately run their criminal history determining their eligibility. For example..... Gus sends us on a Friday applicant leads. We will begin calling them the same Friday afternoon, the following Monday, and Tuesday. Those that answer we schedule to attend Orientation Wednesday (of the same week). They bring all the necessary documents we need. We prescreen the folder for eligibility and conduct a jail tour. The next day (Thursday) we begin criminal history checks. By Friday we can determine whether they passed the criminal history background phase. Those passing the criminal history background are then set up for PAT the following Wednesday. So from the time Gus sends us a led up to PAT, can be as quick as 8 days. We hold orientation every other Wednesday of the Month. We hold PAT every other Wednesday of the Month. We try to only schedule up to 15. What if it takes longer than anticipated to verify background?</i></p> <p>Have additional SO staff been assigned to conduct backgrounds? <i>Yes, recently we had about 5-7 other members conduct background investigations into applicant folders.</i></p> <p>If so, how many additional staff are assigned to this task? What is the total number of staff assigned to recruitment? <i>No one full time. Different members are chosen at different times to attend job fairs.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>20. Components of jail operations are unsafe and expose the entire jail to possible security threats.</p>	<p>Install metal detectors at the front doors of the lobby, lock the front doors after visitation hours, place an additional deputy at the front desk, and move the front desk so that it is not in a direct sight line of the front doors.</p>	<p>Certified, armed deputies work the Lobby. Inherent within the law enforcement profession is always a risk that is understood by the member behind the badge, regardless if the assignment is working the lobby or serving an arrest warrant on a private property. There is a unique balance between fortifying the Lobby area to significantly reduce risks and providing a customer service atmosphere that we consider appropriate for visitors. The Sheriff's Office is not considering adjusting security by placing metal detectors at the main entrance or moving the front desk. There are metal detectors in the Lobby that separate the public area of the lobby from the secure area of the Jail and those metal detectors will remain. One additional security measure that the Sheriff's Office is considering that was mentioned in the audit is a locking mechanism on the front doors to the lobby that can be overridden by a remote switch controlled by the deputy. The Sheriff's Office foresees this recommendation as very beneficial in that it provides the deputy working the lobby an additional layer of security and more control over public access to the lobby area.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>20. Follow-up: Occupational health and safety of employees is a primary concern in public safety as well as general employment. Would the SO consider relocating the front desk as mentioned in the audit report so that it is not in the direct sight line of the front doors? <i>Not at this time. We are moving forward with a locking mechanism on the front doors that will be in effect from 8PM to 8AM. It will have one or more cameras, a speaker system, and a remote switch to lock or unlock the doors. The purpose of this system would require any visitors after 8PM to announce their presence (by remote speaker) to the deputy assigned to the Lobby and their purpose for wanting entrance into the Lobby. If the deputy approves, then he/she can remotely unlock the door(s) from a switch located at the deputy desk.</i></p>			
<p>21. Volunteers related to inmate programming are not required to follow the established visitation policy nor do they undergo background screening.</p>	<p>Jail personnel need to follow the Visitation/ Programming Policy regarding volunteers and student interns accessing the jail.</p>	<p>A thorough review and assessment of applicable policies, procedures, and practices to ensure that standards are being followed to eliminate potential or actual breaches in security.</p>	<p>Immediate</p>

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>21. Follow-up: After the review and assessment of policies, which policies were determined to need adjustments? What were the specific adjustments considered and implemented? <i>The policies may not need adjusting. It may be that we find that deputies are not following the policies that are correctly written. As it relates to volunteers, background checks, and access to the Jail, these policies have not been reviewed since the audit.</i></p> <p>Does the SO plan on reviewing policies on a regular basis; if so, how often (semi-annual, annually, etc.)? <i>Who is responsible for conducting the reviews?</i> <i>Policy reviews by the Command Staff is an ongoing process. Policies get reviewed annually if it is related to training, or it could be a longer time frame, generally not longer than 3 years.</i></p>			
<p>22. Due to staffing shortages, critical positions whose main responsibility is the safety of deputies in the jail are typically the first to be reassigned to a different function.</p>	<p>There should be two victors assigned per shift, one transferring inmates and one assisting deputies in the pods. If coverage is needed for an inmate outside of the jail, deputies from non- security posts, such as laundry detail, should be used to cover as needed.</p>	<p>Assessing staffing levels to ensure the victor positions are covered. Of particular note is assessing staffing on the weekends and nights when there are less deputy support positions available that can respond to incidents for backup.</p>	<p>Immediate</p>
<p>22. Follow-up: Please list what changes have been implemented that will provide adequate coverage for the safety of employees and inmates. <i>As of 05/10/19, 4 additional deputies from the Field Section have been reassigned to the Jail Section for manpower support. These reassignments are in addition to the earlier reassignments that took place about 2 months ago. What did the earlier reassignment consist of?</i></p>			
<p>23. Staffing shortages in the Jail Division are resulting in improper jail security.</p>	<p>Recruitment and retention must be improved to assure proper coverage of all security posts within the jail.</p>	<p>See comments on #19.</p>	<p>On-going</p>
<p>23. Follow-up: As in #19, have additional staff been assigned to recruitment? <i>No.</i></p> <p>When did the SO assume the responsibility of the background investigation process from Human Resources? <i>About 4 months ago.</i></p> <p>What recruitment outcomes are anticipated by taking over the initial applicant background investigation process from Human Resources and how will these outcomes be measured? <i>We hope to speed up the hiring process rather than letting applications sit at HR. We are contacting applicants to get their applications complete, so this will serve to push the applications for completion to begin the full background checks or it will "weed out" those applications that are stale or one which the applicants no longer have an interest.</i></p> <p>Please specify/quantify the changes and improvements in numbers and retention levels you are expecting as an outcome of these additional efforts. <i>Our focus and energy is to get as many qualified applicants hired as we can. We know that we have many openings, so measuring retention percentages and levels is secondary to getting people hired.</i></p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
24. Employees fear retaliation from the supervisory staff.	Employees should be allowed to uphold the policies and procedures of the jail without fear of disciplinary actions being taken against them.	The Sheriff's Office does not lead by fear and intimidation. Our policies and actions reflect that. The Sheriff has an open door policy and reminds deputies of that often. Just this week, the Sheriff met individually with a deputy to hear his/her concerns. The meeting request was granted in an open environment (occurred at a shift briefing). Deputies are welcome and invited to share any concerns. Any instances of leading by fear, intimidation, or retaliation will swiftly be addressed if it becomes known.	N/A
<p>24. Follow-up:</p> <p>While we agree the policies do not support the action of supervisors leading by fear, numerous accounts were expressed in the employee survey. In addition, employees indicated in interviews that a culture of intimidation did actually exist. According to the employee survey results, 54% of employees stated they cannot speak honestly with their supervisor. What actions will the SO be willing to take to determine how the perception of retaliation affects retention levels?</p> <p><i>Our prior response stands. Without concrete, specific examples, we are unable to address these vague accusations.</i></p> <p>If an instance occurs where it is reported that the Sheriff has lead by fear, intimidation, or retaliation, who addresses the action?</p> <p><i>It has been shared with members that such things as harassment, discrimination and other high level offenses, these issues can be directly reported to HR.</i></p> <p>What is the specific policy for reporting retaliation?</p> <p><i>This is covered in the CCSO's Harassment policy and HR's policy.</i></p>			

<p>25. Morale is low due to factors including leadership, lack of training, and safety concerns which have all negatively impacted retention.</p>	<p>Training, safety, overtime, sick leave abuse policy, favoritism, leadership, and inconsistencies in enforcement of disciplinary actions need to be addressed and improved to raise morale.</p>	<p>1. Training: Strengthen the JTO program; Offer more live training versus online training; Offer more basic and fundamental training.</p> <p>2. Safety: We contend that the Jail is safe. Any attempted threats or committed acts of violence against staff or against other inmates is handled swiftly. There was not a riot in Unit 5 as reported by a respondent in the audit.</p> <p>3. Sick Leave Abuse: At one point sick leave abuse was rampant. It has now been addressed according to fair practices. There is no longer a wide spread sick leave abuse problem. Our leave usage policy comports with other policies from other departments in the Unified Government. Although our policy states that members may be required to furnish "examinations performed", this was not a practice. No member of the Sheriff's Office was required to submit personal medical data in violation of HIPPA, only a physician's note for an absence. The policy language will be changed.</p> <p>4. Favoritism: Decisions from Command and Supervisors are made fairly and equitably. If by chance any decisions that are made are known to be biased or based in favoritism, it will be corrected. Again, all personnel are welcome to voice their grievances, but if it is not known it can't be corrected. Favoritism is not a part of the Sheriff's Office culture.</p> <p>5. Leadership: Much of what the audit suggested has already been addressed in a prior responses. One change that was implemented in recent months is that all of our supervisors are required to enter every housing at least once per shift. This is to support the deputies for breaks and to attend to any pending issues that may be present in the housing unit. The audit suggests that the leadership team is not aware or concerned with the reasons former staff have voluntarily left the agency. This is not true. All members that leave voluntarily are interviewed and in some cases accommodations are made to retain the member.</p>	<p>Immediate</p>
--	---	---	-------------------------

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>25. Follow-up:</p> <p>Training: What additional instructor-led training opportunities will be offered? <i>Direct Supervision Training - Fall 2019; FBI LEEDA Supervisor Leadership class - November 2019; JTO certification training - Fall 2019; Mental Health First Aid - March 2019 and possibly again in Winter 2020.</i></p> <p>Safety: According to the employee survey, 64% of employees responded that jail safety is a major concern. Can you explain the difference in the high percentage of concern expressed by employees in relation to jail safety and the contradictory contention of administration that the jail is safe? <i>Again, we contend that our practices are sound. These practices include staffing each shift, exercising the use of force continuum, classification of inmates, and the inmate disciplinary system. We are currently working on strengthening our training requirements and initiatives, such as the JTO program.</i></p> <p>Sick Leave Abuse: The leave usage policy may appear to be beneficial to the SO if one is only looking at a reduction in the use of leave hours by employees. However, the fear felt by employees regarding disciplinary actions for using earned leave has a negative impact on employee morale. As stated in the report, this policy "has also proven to encourage employees who are ill to come to work even though they may be contagious and the disease could spread to co-workers, inmates, and visitors". <i>The ACC policy says "Sick leave is not to be considered a right that employees may use at their discretion, but a privilege not to be abused." If members are not abusing sick leave then they should not feel "encouraged" to come to work if ill. Members were given disciplinary action if they had a history of abusing sick leave and continued to abuse sick leave by not providing a required doctors excuse. Morale of those members who don't abuse sick leave matters as well.</i></p> <p>Favoritism: In the response "If by chance any decisions that are made are known to be biased or based in favoritism, it will corrected". Why would they be allowed to be made if they are known to be biased or based on favoritism? How likely are decisions by chance? The Command Staff may state that personnel are welcome to voice grievances, but survey responses indicated 54% of employees feel that they cannot speak honestly with the supervisory teams (up to and including the Sheriff) about issues and concerns, it is highly unlikely that the employees will do so. As such, it is more times than not SO employees. <i>"If by chance" phrase should be taken in the context that hundreds of decisions are made each day. The implication that biased decisions are made on purpose or with aforethought is not true. From time to time, there are some decisions that are made that may inadvertently not be the wisest decision if more thought had been given to it. We attempt to make the best decisions all the time with the backdrop of the betterment of the organization as top priority. There may be occasions when a member will think a decision is based in favoritism against them, but there may be larger implications for the organization as a whole that the certain member may not understand. Our decisions are not rooted in favoritism, retaliation, discrimination, harassment, or in biases.</i></p>			
26. Disciplinary policies are not enforced consistently among staff.	Jail leadership should demonstrate a common understanding of disciplinary policies and enforce disciplinary actions equally among violators.	For the most part, we contend that disciplinary actions are consistently applied. For any variations in disciplinary actions, the following reasons suggest why that may occur: 1. Past record; 2. Rank, length of service & knowledge of the rules; 3. Attitude – Will the member accept discipline or blame others; 4. Aggravating Circumstances – Was there an injury to others; 5. Mitigating circumstances.	On-going

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>26. Follow-up: An employee's personnel record, previous offenses, and even aggravating circumstances can affect the type of disciplinary action taken against employees. However, how does rank, length of service, knowledge of rules or even how the employee will receive discipline play into the overall disciplinary decision? <i>These are a part of the Douglas factors in the federal case Douglas vs. Veterans Administration. These factors should be considered and used as a guide when determining what is fair, reasonable, and the severity of the disciplinary action.</i></p> <p>Why aren't disciplinary actions based solely on violation of policy or failure to follow written protocol. <i>To a very large extent yes, but other factors also need to be considered.</i></p> <p>Is a person of higher rank held to a higher standard? If not, why not? Do they receive more leniency because of their rank? <i>Yes, they are held to a higher standard. Rank is just one factor, but several factors are used to determine the severity of the disciplinary action.</i></p> <p>Are the specific standards cited in the department's disciplinary policy? <i>Policy cites intent, damage, and frequency which are broader factors and encompass many of the Douglas factors.</i></p> <p>Were any mitigating circumstances documented? How does the SO defend their decisions if one feels they are not treated fairly based on a similar scenario? <i>Members are not excluded from voicing their input into the disciplinary process. Any such input would allow for disciplinary actions to be further considered and / or explained to the person being disciplined.</i></p>			
<p>27. Employees of the Sheriff's Office perceive the Sick Leave Abuse Policy and enforcement as a form of punishment and retaliation.</p>	<p>Abolishment of the currently implemented Sick Leave Abuse Policy and replace with a revised Leave Usage Policy.</p>	<p>The Sheriff's Office does not have a sick leave abuse policy, but we do have a leave usage policy. The leave usage policy is similar to other departments in the Unified Gov't. Enforcement of the leave usage policy is not based as a form of punishment or retaliation, but simply to prevent members from abusing a privilege afforded to them as an employed member of the Sheriff's Office, particularly in light of how sick leave abuse can diminish morale for those members who have to work overtime to cover for those members who are using excessive, unexcused sick leave. Enforcement of the leave usage policy was supported by HR.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>27. Follow-up: The leave usage policy which was referred to routinely by employees of the SO as the "Sick Leave Abuse Policy", appears to be beneficial to the SO if one is only looking at a reduction in the use of leave hours by employees. However, the fear felt by employees regarding disciplinary actions for using that earned leave has a negative impact on morale. As stated in the report, this policy "has also proven to encourage employees who are ill to come to work even though they may be contagious and the disease could spread to co-workers, inmates, and visitors".</p> <p>While the enforcement of this policy is not based as a form of punishment or retaliation, it is perceived by the employees as such.</p>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
28. The Sick Leave Abuse Policy has not achieved its desired effect.	Abolishment of the currently implemented Sick Leave Abuse Policy and replace with a revised Leave Usage Policy.	The Sheriff's Office contends that it has achieved its desired effect. Initially there were approximately 25 individuals who were deemed sick leave abusers, now it is 5 or less.	N/A
28. Follow-up: If the SO's determined the Sick Leave Abuse Policy has achieved its desired effect and it is no longer an issue why not abolish the policy and replace it with a revised Leave Usage Policy? <i>We do not have a sick leave abuse policy. Members are placed on sick leave abuse protocol if they abuse sick leave. Such protocol would begin with a counseling statement (not a disciplinary action) which requires them to get a doctors excuse for what would otherwise be an unexcused absence.</i>			
29. The Sheriff's Office Leave Usage Policy needs to be revised.	Sections II A. 1, 2, 3, and Section II B. 2 need to be revised.	Revision to Section II A 3, and Section II B 2 only to remove the phrase "examination(s) performed".	Immediate
30. Lack of trust in the leadership exists across all divisions of the Sheriff's Office.	All supervisory and management staff within the Sheriff's Office need to build a rapport of trust with all employees.	Prior Responses relate to this category.	On-going
31. Leadership at the jail contributes to low morale and lack of trust by employees.	The Sheriff's Office must reevaluate and in some cases replace current Jail Division leadership in order to restore employee confidence and morale.	Changes in leadership at the Jail has occurred in part due to this audit, but mostly for other reasons.	Completed
32. Operations at the jail are negatively impacted by the actions of the Jail Commander.	The current Jail Commander should be replaced with an individual who upholds the code of conduct of the Sheriff's Office.	There has been a change in the Jail Commander position.	Completed
33. The Sheriff is unaware or uninformed of the issues within the Jail Division.	The Sheriff needs to make a more concerted effort to address and acknowledge all of his employees. The Sheriff should make every effort to visit the jail regularly (at least bi- monthly) to encourage informal contact with staff and inmates and to informally observe living and working conditions at the jail.	The Sheriff visits the Jail regularly, and is apprised of operations and conditions at the Jail.	On-going
33. Follow-up: Many employees, from Deputies to Captains, believe that the Sheriff would be far more involved if the former Jail Commander had better informed him of problems at the jail. With the appointment of a new Jail Commander are there plans to increase the information provided to the Sheriff by that position? <i>At this time, there are no plans to implement additional procedures for the flow of information.</i> Based on comments from staff, how could the Sheriff use his office at the jail to enhance his relationship with those employed at the jail? <i>The Sheriff uses his office at the Jail. Whenever the office is used it is normally coupled with a tour of the jail to greet members on shift and interact with them.</i>			

AUDIT FINDING	RECOMMENDATION	ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN -OR- PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED	IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME
<p>34. The leadership team either do not know or are unconcerned with the reasons former staff voluntarily left the Sheriff's Office.</p>	<p>The SO should hire a consultant to administer an employee survey annually to understand the level of job satisfaction amongst employees.</p>	<p>Recent survey was administered and those surveys were meticulously reviewed and assessed. A number of initiatives were employed as a result of the responses from those surveys. Consideration will be given to using an outside consultant for future surveys.</p>	<p>On-going</p>
<p>34. Follow-up: The language in the audit report specifically suggests the SO hire an independent third-party consultant to administer anonymous employee surveys annually or until retention and recruitment levels increase. Anonymous surveys are beneficial as employees can express their concerns freely; the feedback shared is what should be focused on rather than who provided the information. Were the surveys administered by the SO anonymous? <i>No.</i> If not, what statements or questions within the surveys garnered assurance to the employees that they could be honest when responding? <i>None. Communications are always expected to be honest.</i> How many surveys has the SO administered between September 2018 and April 2019? <i>One.</i> Please provide copies of all surveys initiated by the SO between September 2018 and April 2019 along with the subsequent responses. <i>See embedded document.</i> As a result of the SO survey responses, please identify the new initiatives recently employed. <i>Rotation of shifts at the jail;</i> <i>Breaks for deputies at the jail during 12 hour shifts for 15-30 minutes;</i> <i>Placing the JTO Program under the Training Unit supervision;</i> <i>Restart of 2 week orientation training at the jail;</i> <i>Implementation of classes added to training for in person training;</i> <i>A fresh look at the hiring process which is now down to an average of 3 months now;</i></p>			